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ORWELL’S 1984 AND A FOURTH AMENDMENT
CYBERSURVEILLANCE NONINTRUSION TEST
Margaret Hu
Abstract: This Article describes a cybersurveillance nonintrusion test under the Fourth
Amendment that is grounded in evolving customary law to replace the reasonable expectation
of privacy test formulated in Katz v. United States. To illustrate how customary law norms are
shaping modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, this Article examines the recurrence of
judicial references to George Orwell’s novel, 1984, within the Fourth Amendment context
when federal courts have assessed the constitutionality of modern surveillance methods. The
Supreme Court has indicated that the Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine must now evolve to
impose meaningful limitations on the intrusiveness of new surveillance technologies.
A cybersurveillance nonintrusion test implicitly suggested by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Jones first shifts the vantage point of the Fourth Amendment analysis from an
individual-based tangible harm inquiry to an inquiry of a society-wide intangible harm—
whether the modern surveillance method creates a “1984 problem” for society. A
cybersurveillance nonintrusion test requires the government to justify the intrusion of the
surveillance on society. A new test would remediate increasingly ineffective Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence currently grounded in property and tort law. The Article argues that
the adoption of a cybersurveillance nonintrusion test and the abandonment of the current
privacy test is not only required; but, in practice, is already used by the federal courts.
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INTRODUCTION
The disclosures provided by former National Security Agency (NSA)
contractor Edward Snowden1 revealed a pervasive post-9/11 surveillance
apparatus2 and rapidly proliferating cybersurveillance3 architectures.4
1. See generally GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND
detail the history of the Snowden disclosures).
2. Scholars and experts have examined the legal implications of the mass surveillance activities of
the NSA and the intelligence community in work both preceding and following the disclosures of
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection:
Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 759–72 (2014)
(describing NSA mass surveillance before and after the Snowden disclosures); Laura K. Donohue,
Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 117, 4, 22–41 (2015) (outlining the origins of current NSA programs and the relevant
authorities); Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment
Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 5–31 (2015)
(applying First Amendment implications of surveillance programs); Orin S. Kerr, A Rule of Lenity for
National Security Surveillance Law, 100 VA. L. REV. 1513, 2–22 (2014) (arguing that Congress
should adopt a rule of narrow construction of the surveillance statutes); Peter Margulies, Dynamic
Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Content Collection After Snowden, 66 HASTINGS
L.J. 1, 1–76 (2014) (outlining a dynamic conception of national security surveillance justifying
programs disclosed by Snowden but calling for increased transparency and accountability); Paul
Ohm, Electronic Surveillance Law and the Intra-Agency Separation of Powers, 47 U.S.F. L. REV.
269, 271–90 (2012) (proposing an intra-agency separation of powers pitting part of the Justice
Department against itself, creating competition for interpretations of statutory and constitutional
surveillance law); Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Realism and the National Security Agency’s Civil
Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 112, 116–206 (2015) (describing how the “intelligence
legalism” phenomenon offers inadequate protection of individual liberties); Christopher Slobogin,
Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J.
1721, 1722–26 (2014) (arguing that any legislative delegation to law enforcement should be subject
to several prerequisites); Omer Tene, A New Harm Matrix for Cybersecurity Surveillance, 12 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 391, 392–403 (2014) (outlining new parameters for analysis of the privacy impact of
communications monitoring programs); Patrick Toomey & Brett Max Kaufman, The Notice Paradox:
Secret Surveillance, Criminal Defendants, & the Right to Notice, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843, 843–
901 (2014) (explaining how the multiplicity of surveillance techniques is eroding the notice restraints
on illegal searches); Stephen I. Vladeck, Big Data Before and After Snowden, 7 J. NAT’L SEC. L. &
POL’Y 333, 334 (2014) (noting that some of the most well-known programs were “the PRISM
program under section 702, and the bulk telephone metadata program under section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act”); Stephen I. Vladeck, Standing and Secret Surveillance, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR
INFO. SOC’Y 551, 575–77 (2014) (noting pitfalls of legal challenges to NSA programs).
3. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 209 (2006) (describing cybersurveillance or
“digital surveillance” as “the process by which some form of human activity is analyzed by a
computer according to some specified rule. . . . [T]he critical feature in each [case of surveillance] is
that a computer is sorting data for some follow-up review by some human”); Mark Andrejevic,
Surveillance in the Big Data Era, in EMERGING PERVASIVE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGIES (PICT): ETHICAL CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND SAFEGUARDS 55, 56 (Kenneth
D. Pimple, ed. Law, Governance and Technology Ser. No. 11, 2014) (explaining that big data
surveillance is defined by “the imperative . . . to monitor the population as a whole” because
“otherwise it is harder to consistently and reliably discern useful patterns”); David Lyon, Surveillance,
Snowden and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique, 1(2) BIG DATA & SOC. 1 (2014).
THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014) (discussing in
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Prior to these revelations, the Supreme Court had already signaled that
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine must evolve to accommodate
limitations on government intrusiveness in light of increasingly
comprehensive and invasive cybersurveillance technologies.5 In both
4. Experts increasingly describe big data surveillance or cybersurveillance in architectural terms.
See, e.g., JENNIFER STISA GRANICK, AMERICAN SPIES: MODERN SURVEILLANCE, WHY YOU SHOULD
CARE, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2017); BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN
BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 48 (2015) (“This has evolved into
a shockingly extensive, robust, and profitable surveillance architecture.”); Margaret Hu, Small Data
Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773, 788, 813, 816, 832 (2015)
(describing the architecture of cybersurveillance and its proponents’ aspirations); Margaret Hu,
Taxonomy of the Snowden Disclosures, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1679, 1690 (2015) (“Under big data
cybersurveillance architecture, big data tools appear to track and isolate suspicious data and not
suspicious persons.”); GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 90–120 (exploring the cooperation between
private industry and the NSA). Several important works have been published in recent years, shedding
light on mass surveillance technologies as well as the policy and programmatic framework of
cybersurveillance and covert intelligence gathering. See, e.g., JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A
QUEST FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 17–18
(2014) (describing how the government, private companies, and even criminals use technology to
indiscriminately collect vast amounts of personal data); SHANE HARRIS, @WAR: THE RISE OF THE
MILITARY-INTERNET COMPLEX (2014) (describing the unique threat of cyber threats); SHANE
HARRIS, THE WATCHERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S SURVEILLANCE STATE (2010) (detailing the
acceleration of mass surveillance in the U.S.); ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 34, 145
(2006) (describing the architecture of databases containing vast amounts of personal data); DANA
PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERICAN SECURITY
STATE 158–80 (2011) (detailing the vulnerability of the big data surveillance network); JEFFREY
ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 147 (2004)
(surveying post-9/11 surveillance architecture and questioning whether justification outweighs risks
to constitutional democracy).
5. See, e.g., Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014) (stating that a warrantless
search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–13 (2012) (concluding that the government’s
installation of a GPS device on defendant’s vehicle constituted a “search” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment). A number of scholars have discussed the transformation of the Fourth
Amendment in response to technological developments. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald,
Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored E-mail, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 177 (arguing that
Fourth Amendment precedent supports judicial recognition of a reasonable expectation of privacy in
stored email that accords warrant-level protection); Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an
Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75 MISS. L.J. 1, 51–83 (2005) (considering how privacy guarantees
can be adapted in light of ubiquitous technology); Deven R. Desai, Constitutional Limits on
Surveillance: Associational Freedom in the Age of Data Hoarding, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579,
591–632 (2014) (examining the implications of the growing technology of backward-looking
surveillance for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth
Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1181–1328 (2016) (arguing that reclaiming the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment is essential for understanding the scope of its protections in the
face of new technologies); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth
Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 805–80 (2016) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment’s
existing language can be adapted to address new surveillance technologies); Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 547–631 (2017) (suggesting
using the principle of informational security as the organizing framework for a digital Fourth
Amendment); Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of
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United States v. Jones,6 a decision that preceded the Snowden revelations,
and Riley v. California,7 a decision issued in the immediate aftermath of
the revelations, the Supreme Court has struggled with adapting Fourth
Amendment8 jurisprudence to modern surveillance technologies.9
The development of a new legal privacy doctrine supplanting the
groundbreaking “reasonable expectation of privacy” test established in

Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 681–749 (2011) (concluding that courts should decide, per
constitutional precedent, that applications for location data must satisfy the probable cause standard
of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement); David Gray, Dangerous Dicta, 72 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1181, 1181–205 (2015) (arguing that rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment are
collective rather than individual); David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy,
98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 101–26 (2013) (proposing that developers of surveillance technologies should
include constraints on the aggregation and retention of data along with use and access limitations to
provide a framework of Fourth Amendment pre-commitments preserving law enforcement interests
while minimizing threats to privacy); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth
Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L.
REV. 975, 978–1026 (2007) (arguing for the adoption of practical applications delineated in divergent
state jurisprudence to protect third-party information); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the
Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 285–329 (2015) (considering how Fourth Amendment law
should adapt to the global nature of Internet-based surveillance); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of
the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 311–54 (2012) (proposing a “mosaic theory” of the
Fourth Amendment, under which courts evaluate a collective sequence of government action as an
aggregated whole to consider whether the activity constitutes a search); Rachel Levinson-Waldman,
Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in
Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527, 527–615 (2017) (outlining a new, multifaceted approach for both courts
and law enforcement to utilize when determining whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated by
public surveillance); Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment:
Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1393–
437 (2002) (arguing for the adoption of a proportionality principle dictating that “search” be defined
broadly for Fourth Amendment purposes); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C.
L. REV. 1511, 1513–15 (2010) (arguing that courts’ current approach to the Fourth Amendment has
“led to a complicated morass of doctrines and theories” and also ignored problems caused by
“inadequately constrained government power, lack of accountability of law enforcement officials, and
excessive police discretion”).
6. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
7. __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
8. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. See generally LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: PRIVACY AND
SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE (2016); DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF
SURVEILLANCE (2017); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757 (1994); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349
(1974).
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1967 by Katz v. United States10 has yet to occur.11 The Katz test
formulated fifty years ago remains intact and presents a foundational
inquiry for the development of all modern Fourth Amendment privacy
jurisprudence. Yet, that test does not appear to be offended by
cybersurveillance and dataveillance12 tools. Emerging surveillance tools
are capable of subjecting all citizens and noncitizens alike to mass,
suspicionless criminal and national security profiling through the
amassing and analysis of potentially limitless and comprehensive
digitized data.13
This Article argues that, in the absence of new Fourth Amendment
doctrine, federal courts, including the Supreme Court, are guided by
cultural norms about what constitutes overreaching or unreasonable
government surveillance. To illustrate this customary law14 dimension of
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, this Article examines the
consistent recurrence of Orwellian rhetoric in judicial hearings and
decisions analyzing the constitutionality of emerging cybersurveillance
techniques and technologies. For example, George Orwell’s novel 198415
10. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
11. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Erwin Chemerinsky, Is It Time To Go High-Tech on the
Fourth Amendment?, ABA J. (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky
_is_it_time_to_go_high_tech_on_the_fourth_amendment/ [https://perma.cc/MS2H-NWT4] (“On
Jan. 17, [2014,] the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases that hopefully will force it to
bring the Fourth Amendment into the 21st Century. . . . The court has had the chance to deal with this
question in recent years and has failed to do so.”).
12. Roger Clarke is credited with introducing the term “dataveillance” and defines dataveillance as
systematic monitoring or investigation of individuals’ actions, activities, or communications through
the use of information technology. See Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance,
31 COMM. ACM 498, 499 (1988).
13. Id. For an excellent overview of the types of data collected and analyzed by the government for
criminal and national security profiling, see RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, WHAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES WITH AMERICANS’ DATA (2013). For a summary of the
implications of big data surveillance, see VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG
DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013); Anita L.
Allen, Protecting One’s Own Privacy in a Big Data Economy, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 71 (2016); Julie
E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1094 (2013); Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime
Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Noncustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327 (2014);
Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013).
14. Customary law “is generally considered to have two elements: state practice and opinio juris.
State practice refers to general and consistent practice by states, while opinio juris means that the
practice is followed out of a belief of legal obligation.” Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and
Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L LAW 757,
757 (2001) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987)); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 4–11(5th ed. 1998); MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES 130 (1999);
ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (1971).
15. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
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was invoked during the Supreme Court oral argument in United States v.
Jones on at least six separate occasions.16 Often, the 1984 “parade of
horribles” rhetoric allows the federal judiciary to depart from settled
Fourth Amendment precedent to restrain the government surveillance
method or cybersurveillance program in question. Jones addressed the
constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking, yet it is significant to note
that other cases in lower federal courts addressing the government’s bulk
telephony metadata surveillance program—the first NSA program
revealed by the Snowden disclosures17—have provoked a similar reaction,
with a district court explicitly referring to the NSA program as “almostOrwellian.”18
Under customary law, established community standards or social
norms that can be construed as objectively verifiable and long-standing
are given the force of law.19 Customary international law, to take one
example, enshrines universal or nearly universal principles of human
rights into a well-recognized body of customary law: international human
rights law.20 Customary domestic law has been defined as “the common
16. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, 25, 27, 33, 35, 57, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400
(2012) (No. 10-1259).
17. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2013).
18. Id. at 33 (holding that the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata surveillance program was “almostOrwellian” and likely to be violative of the Fourth Amendment). Judge Leon of the District Court of
D.C. stated: “I cannot imagine a more ‘indiscriminate’ and ‘arbitrary invasion’ than this systematic
and high-tech collection and retention of personal data on virtually every single citizen for purposes
of querying and analyzing it without prior judicial approval.” Id. at 42.
19. Although customary law is often associated with “Customary International Law,” some
scholars have explored the “Customary Domestic Law” dimension of customary law. See, e.g.,
Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present in Substantive Due Process Analysis, 62 DUKE
L.J. 535, 540 (2012) (explaining how tradition is a limiting principle operating as a limiting criterion
“prevent[ing] courts from substituting their own subjective preferences for those of the legislatures”
who “are free to depart from tradition” whereas “courts are not”). Moreover, the concepts of
“constitutional conscience,” “constitutional redemption,” and “constitutional conventions” arguably
embody customary law principles. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 35
(2011) (explaining how constitutional law develops via various constructions, institutions, statutes,
and practices that have built up around the text); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION, 80–103 (2008) (contending that the
Constitution requires judges to decide cases in good faith, using the “constitutional virtues” of candor,
intellectual honesty, humility about the limits of constitutional adjudication, and willingness to admit
that they do not have all the answers); Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss,
Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 257–322
(2017) (explaining how historical practice might be invoked to support nonlegal but obligatory norms
of acceptable government behavior or “constitutional conventions”).
20. Customary International Law “is typically defined as the collection of international behavioral
regularities that nations over time come to view as binding as a matter of law.” Jack L. Goldsmith &
Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1999)
(citing, inter alia, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
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law that develops on the national level and is authoritative in . . . [the
United States] and in any common law country.”21 Domestic customary
law; however, evades easy definition. Domestic customary law often
refers to the domestic application of customary international law. In The
Paquete Habana,22 the Court established that customary international law
“is part of” customary domestic law.23
More recently, the Second Circuit, in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,24
signaled a willingness to move toward the domestic incorporation of
customary international law norms and standards. The Second Circuit
recognized that “domestic jurisdiction” has been “left by international law
for regulation by States.”25 It concluded that “[t]here are, therefore, no
matters which are domestic by their ‘nature.’ All are susceptible of
international legal regulation and may become the subjects of new rules
of customary law of treaty obligations.”26 Domestic customary law
encompasses a wide range of subjects beyond simple incorporation of
customary international law.27
§ 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987)). The very concept of Customary International Law and the
applicability of its legal boundaries, however, are contested in some academic debates. See, e.g.,
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 815–76 (1997) (concluding that, absent
authorization by the federal political branches, customary international law should not have the status
of federal law); Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE
L.J. 202, 241–75 (2010) (arguing that the conventional wisdom that nations cannot unilaterally
withdraw from the unwritten rules of customary international law is difficult to justify).
21. Brief for Appellant at 45, Gipson v. Callahan, 157 F.3d 903 (5th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-51021).
22. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
23. Id. at 700.
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by
years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with
the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence
of what the law really is.
Id. (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163, 164, 214, 215 (1895)); see also Berta E. HernándezTruyol & Kimberly A. Johns, Global Rights, Local Wrongs, and Legal Fixes: An International
Human Rights Critique of Immigration and Welfare “Reform,” 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 547, 591 n.224
(1998).
24. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
25. Id. at 888–89 (quoting Lawrence Preuss, Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the Charter of the United
Nations and Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction, Hague Receuil (Extract 149) at 8, reprinted in THE
LAW OF NATIONS 23–24 (Herbert W. Briggs ed., 1952)).
26. Id.; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 n.1 (2d Cir. 1995) (relying on language from
Filártiga regarding treaties and customary international law).
27. Although much important scholarship is conducted in this field, an exhaustive discussion of
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This Article contends that, in assessing the societal impact of
cybersurveillance, the Supreme Court and other federal courts have
implicitly recognized that privacy customs or anti-surveillance customs
exist and have normative value in the Fourth Amendment context. The
federal judiciary, with increasing frequency, marks unconstitutional
transgressions resulting from modern surveillance techniques by resorting
to dystopian 1984-related tropes.28 Regardless of how well-supported the
government’s position is by preexisting Fourth Amendment precedent,
the Supreme Court and lower courts have questioned whether the Fourth
Amendment should operate to protect society from the “1984 problem”
posed by emerging mass surveillance programs and cybersurveillance
technologies.29
As these decisions accumulate, it is apparent that Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence lacks a clear, unifying data privacy doctrine.30 Prior Fourth
domestic customary law and customary international law goes beyond the scope of this Article. See,
e.g., supra notes 18–23 and accompanying text. See also Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?,
in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 118 (Jody S. Kraus
& Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) (discussing and citing the work in so-called pragmatics—better
described to non-philosophers as linguistic pragmatism); Richard A. Epstein, The Path to the T.J.
Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10 (1992)
(suggesting that parties unfamiliar with customs of the trade may reject any proposed term because it
is unascertainable whether it conforms to the usage, thus leaving the matter to be governed by the
usage); Frederick Schauer, Pitfalls in the Interpretation of Customary Law, in THE NATURE OF
CUSTOMARY LAW: LEGAL, HISTORICAL, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 13, 32 (Amanda
Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy eds., 2007) (comparing the imagined operation of custom
to “the marketplace of ideas”); Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 5, 5–41 (2009) (proposing an informational theory of custom in property law);
George Rutherglen, Custom and Usage as Action Under Color of State Law: An Essay on the
Forgotten Terms of Section 1983, 89 VA. L. REV. 925, 925–77 (2003) (analyzing the meanings of
“custom” and “usage” to determine the scope of Section 1983 and to determine the scope of
congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 20, 903–07 (explaining how customary international law continues to be relevant to domestic
federal common law).
28. See Thomas P. Crocker, Dystopian Constitutionalism, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 595–96
(2015) (discussing the “rich tradition of using contrastive dystopian states in constitutional
argument”).
29. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
U.S. 398 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d
Cir. 2015); Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172 (D.D.C. 2015); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp.
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Donohue, Bulk
Metadata Collection, supra note 2; Donohue, Section 702, supra note 2; Hu, Small Data
Cybersurveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, supra note 4; Orin S. Kerr, The Future of Internet
Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1139 (2004); Richards, supra note 13; Stephen Rushin,
The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 281; Christopher
Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (2008).
30. The Post-Snowden litigation revealed a highly fractured Fourth Amendment as the
constitutionality of the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata program has been analyzed by various federal
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Amendment precedent that appears to be technologically obsolete has
been ignored or discarded31 as the federal judiciary endeavors to avoid the
“1984 problem.” Specifically, by tying the Fourth Amendment
protections to subjective and objective expectations of privacy through the
Katz test, the Court adopted a Fourth Amendment line of analysis that
experts note is problematic in two ways: it is both circular32 and selfdefeating.33 Expectations of privacy change in response to social and

courts. See Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 9 (finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review
Administrative Procedure Act [APA] claim but could hear Fourth Amendment constitutional
challenges to the NSA’s conduct; and granting motion for injunction but staying the order pending
appeal); Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d. 559, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (reversing district court and
remanding for further proceedings); Klayman, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 190–98 (concluding plaintiffs’ claim
that Section 215 program is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment has a likelihood of success
on the merits and ordering injunction, blocking the final 20 days of the Section 215 program, prior to
the implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act’s reforms to metadata collection); Obama v.
Klayman, No. 15–5307, 2015 WL 9010330 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 16, 2015) (granting an emergency motion
for a stay pending appeal); Klayman v. Obama, 805 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (denial of emergency
petition for rehearing en banc); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 750–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(dismissing complaint in part on grounds that subscribers do not have legitimate expectation of
privacy in telephony metadata held by third parties under Fourth Amendment precedent); ACLU v.
Clapper, 785 F.3d at 792 (vacating dismissal of complaint, finding that bulk collection of telephone
metadata exceeded scope of statutory authority, remanding for argument on constitutional issues, and
affirming district court’s denial of preliminary injunction); ACLU v. Clapper, No. 14-42-CV, 2015
WL 4196833 (2d Cir. June 9, 2015) (ordering stay of proceedings pending parties’ supplemental
briefing in light of passage of USA FREEDOM Act); ACLU v. Clapper, 804 F.3d 617, 618 (2d Cir.
2015) (denying motion for preliminary injunction, declining to reach constitutional issues for
prudential reasons, and remanding for further proceedings in district court).
31. Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological Age?, in
CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 11 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes
eds., 2011).
32. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 60–61
(2001) (“Harlan’s test was applauded as a victory for privacy, but it soon became clear that it was
entirely circular.”); Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 60–61
(2001) (“Fourth Amendment doctrine, moreover, is circular, for someone can have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in an area if and only if the Court has held that a search in that area would be
unreasonable.”); Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 383–86 (contending that Katz’s reasoning is circular);
Jonathan Simon, Katz at Forty: A Sociological Jurisprudence Whose Time Has Come, 41 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 935, 956–57 (2008) (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)); Richard Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP.
CT. REV. 173, 187) (“Katz is said to be circular because social expectations of privacy are themselves
presumably influenced by the policy choices of government, including the Supreme Court.”).
33. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the
Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1328 (2002) (“By leaving the decision
to adopt new surveillance technologies largely to the discretion of law enforcement, the Supreme
Court’s current jurisprudence largely stands the amendment on its head.”); Peter P. Swire, Katz is
Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 923 (2004) (arguing that the decreasing effectiveness
of Katz allows for a “very odd constitutional regime where the most common and extensive
searches—those using effective new technologies—are placed outside of the Fourth Amendment”).
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technological developments.34 The normalization of surveillance
diminishes societal and individual expectations of privacy. Justice Breyer,
during oral argument in United States v. Jones, recognized the possibility
of this paradox: ubiquitous surveillance in a democratic society.35
Consequently, repeated references to 1984 during the Jones oral argument
and other Supreme Court cases underscores the normative contours of the
Fourth Amendment—considerations that have become increasingly
central to the judicial inquiry.
In recent years, federal courts have been invited to analyze the
constitutionality of emerging surveillance methods and big data
cybersurveillance. As cybersurveillance tools are rapidly deployed for law
enforcement and national security purposes, it is now possible to review
a body of cybersurveillance law. A broader analysis of these cases allows
one to track the future trajectory of the Fourth Amendment through the
explicit framing and naming of a clear jurisprudential trend. This Article
identifies that trend as a quickly evolving cybersurveillance nonintrusion
test that appears to be displacing the Katz test.
Prior to the development of modern mass surveillance capacities and
cybersurveillance methods, “physical intrusions and bodily intrusions
were primarily at the forefront of the Fourth Amendment inquiry.”36 With
the advent of increasingly invasive cybersurveillance technologies, the
physicality of the intrusion under the Fourth Amendment does not
represent the anchoring concern of the Court.37
34. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring).
35. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 24 (“[W]hat would a
democratic society look like if a large number of people did think that the government was tracking
their every movement over long periods of time[?]”).
36. Margaret Hu, Cybersurveillance Intrusions and the Katz Privacy Test, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (companion symposium piece to this article). “The term physical
intrusions . . . refers to seizures of individuals.” Id. (citing Safford United Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557
U.S. 364, 375 (2009) (permitting a search of a student when it is reasonable in relation to the scope
of the circumstances justifying the search); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991)
(explaining that a seizure of an individual for an arrest requires either a show of force or submission
to authority); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (explaining that a Fourth
Amendment seizure has occurred when, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe
that he was not free to leave); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (permitting a brief investigatory
detention and search of outer clothing for weapons as a “reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment”)). “The term bodily intrusions refers to actions that intrude into an individual’s body.”
Id. (citing Birchfield v. North Dakota, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016) (concluding that
warrantless blood tests are not permitted under the Fourth Amendment because they are “significantly
more intrusive” than breath testing); Maryland v. King, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1977 (2013)
(finding that “the intrusion of a cheek swab to obtain a DNA sample is a minimal one”); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–71 (1966) (finding that exigent circumstances permitted warrantless
blood testing to secure evidence of blood alcohol content)).
37. Hu, Cybersurveillance Intrusions and the Katz Privacy Test, supra note 36 (citing Jones, 565
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Court decisions addressing unprecedented government surveillance
capacities justify their refusal to apply settled precedent by following an
inquiry that centers on cybersurveillance nonintrusion. This Article
demonstrates that, in light of rapidly emerging technological
developments, a cybersurveillance nonintrusion test may be more
appropriate than the Katz test.38 It describes how a cybersurveillance
nonintrusion test grounded in customary law can replace the Fourth
Amendment privacy test that is currently grounded in property and tort
law and dependent on the notion that privacy turns on non-disclosure.
Under the Katz test, the Court leads with an interrogation of whether
an individualized and subjective “reasonable expectation of privacy” has
been offended.39 Next, Katz requires courts to ask whether society would
objectively ratify the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy.40 The
cybersurveillance nonintrusion test implicitly suggested by the Supreme
Court in Jones first shifts the vantage point of the Fourth Amendment
analysis from an individual-based tangible harm inquiry to an inquiry of
a society-wide intangible harm. Other scholars have taken the perspective
that the Fourth Amendment provides more than individual protection—
David Gray argues that “rights secured by the Fourth Amendment are
fundamentally collective rather than individual.”41 A cybersurveillance
nonintrusion test also shifts the burden from the individual. Rather than
require an individual to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy, the
cybersurveillance nonintrusion test requires the government to justify the
intrusion of the surveillance on society.
A cybersurveillance nonintrusion test significantly differs in many
material respects from the Katz privacy test. In assessing the
constitutionality of cybersurveillance under the cybersurveillance
nonintrusion test, the Court has suggested that the two-part Katz test can
U.S. at 405 (“Our later cases, of course, have deviated from that exclusively property-based approach
[to the Fourth Amendment].”); id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“In Katz, this Court enlarged
its then-prevailing focus on property rights by announcing that the reach of the Fourth Amendment
does not ‘turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion.’” (citation omitted))); see also
Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2483–84, 2489 (2014) (describing case precedent
addressing searches incident to arrest and pointing out that the scope of privacy intrusions is far
greater with access to digital data).
38. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
39. Id. But see Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 114–15 (2015) (arguing that Katz is actually a one-step test and the subjective
prong of the Katz test is irrelevant).
40. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
41. GRAY, supra note 9; Gray, Dangerous Dicta, supra note 5, at 1183; see also David Gray, A
Collective Right To Be Secure from Unreasonable Tracking, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 189, 191–92
(2015).
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be reversed: the leading analytical inquiry under the Fourth Amendment
would commence with an interrogation of whether a society-wide,
objective expectation of governmental cybersurveillance nonintrusion has
been offended.42 This Article contends that federal courts are already
making such assessments and that the courts are doing so based on what
they gauge to be the limits of what a court can reasonably ratify under
existing precedent while still adhering to perceived norms of what is
socially intolerable in a free society. Essentially, courts appear to be
considering whether the modern surveillance method creates a “1984
problem” for society and why the Fourth Amendment should operate to
avoid it. The secondary inquiry of a cybersurveillance nonintrusion test
would concern itself with whether an individualized, subjective
“reasonable expectation of privacy” transgression has occurred.
Adoption of the cybersurveillance nonintrusion test would render moot
the preexisting Third Party Doctrine under Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.43 The Court’s leading inquiry under a cybersurveillance
nonintrusion test would no longer turn on assessments of individualized
“expectations of privacy.” Thus, whether an individual has voluntarily
shared digital data with a “third party,” such as an Internet company or
telecommunications company, would no longer control the Fourth
Amendment privacy test. Sharing metadata or data with a third party
telecommunications company would not preclude Fourth Amendment
protection on the grounds that an individual could not subjectively possess
a reasonable expectation of privacy in this metadata because the metadata
had already been shared with the company.
This Article concludes that, especially in light of the Snowden
disclosures, technological developments, and a shift in individual and
social expectations of privacy, a sharp correction of the Fourth
Amendment doctrine—namely the adoption of a cybersurveillance
nonintrusion test and abandonment of the Katz test—is warranted. It is
undisputed that the Court has been forced to grapple with how best to
preserve the integrity of the Fourth Amendment in light of technological
advances.44 Cybersurveillance advancements pose a threat that extends
beyond individualized harms. Individualized harms form the basis of
property and tort law that has traditionally anchored the Fourth
42. See Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 12–13, 44, 51; Hu,
Cybersurveillance Intrusions and an Evolving Katz Privacy Test, supra note 36.
43. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (articulating the Third Party
Doctrine).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(questioning the applicability of the Third Party Doctrine to modern technology and Fourth
Amendment analysis).
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Amendment analysis. Cybersurveillance, however, increasingly
implicates the search and seizure of identity, posing a challenge of mass
harms to the inalienable, autonomous rights of entire populations of
individuals. Consequently, a society-wide or community-wide framework
of customary law is now more appropriate to preserve the first principles
of the Fourth Amendment. The Court itself appears ready to reevaluate its
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in light of the rise of an Information
Society, ubiquitous digital data collection and analysis methods, and big
data surveillance technologies.45
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I addresses the constitutional
implications raised by the big data cybersurveillance and dataveillance
capacities of the government. This part of the Article sets forth the Court’s
current Fourth Amendment doctrine on individual and social privacy
expectations that warrant constitutional protection: the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test first articulated in Katz v. United States.
Technological developments increasingly normalize surveillance into our
daily lives in nearly invisible and physically non-intrusive ways; however,
scholars have questioned the efficacy of the Court’s current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and the preexisting privacy doctrine.46 Part I
concludes that current Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence provides
no robust legal basis for enforcing meaningful limits on big data
cybersurveillance.
Part II sketches out the contours of the Fourth Amendment “1984
problem” posed by big data cybersurveillance. During the Jones oral
argument, and in the Justices’ concurrences in Jones, the Court made clear
that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has not yet developed a limiting
principle to curtail the effects of rapidly advancing technology in the
realm of cybersurveillance and dataveillance.47 Various Justices on the

45. The Court is once again preparing to tackle the Fourth Amendment and changing technology.
On June 5, 2017, the Court granted certiorari in Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir.
2016). See Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402, 2017 WL 2407484 (June 5, 2017). The question
presented in Carpenter is “[w]hether the warrantless seizure and search of historical cell phone
records revealing the location and movements of a cell phone user over the course of 127 days is
permitted by the Fourth Amendment.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10–11, Carpenter, 819 F.3d
880 (No. 16-402).
46. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007) (observing that Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, read broadly, largely permits technological surveillance and arguing for regulatory
reform to protect privacy).
47. See, e.g., Kerr, Mosaic Theory, supra note 5, at 339 (discussing the United States v. Jones
decision in context of the Justice Alito’s concurrence and contending that it echoed a digital “mosaic
theory” approach to the Fourth Amendment).
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Court have used references to 1984 to identify culturally ingrained limits
to tolerable government intrusiveness.48
In Part III, this Article asserts that the jurisprudence must evolve to
establish limitations on government intrusiveness—limitations that are
culturally ingrained—as part of an assessment of whether the newly
emerging cybersurveillance method or mass surveillance program is
considered objectively or subjectively reasonable. In light of the
government’s 1984-like capacity to conduct the search and seizure of
digitally constructed identities, the Court in Jones suggested that an
inquiry centered around cybersurveillance nonintrusion, rather than
privacy, might be more appropriate in the digital age.49 Part III discusses
recent decisions by both the Supreme Court and lower courts confronting
modern surveillance technologies. It shows how those cases point the way
toward a cybersurveillance nonintrusion test grounded in customary law
to replace a privacy test that is often grounded in property and tort law.
Such a test is results-oriented and avoids what federal courts fear may be
judicial ratification of Orwellian surveillance with their corresponding
constriction of individual privacy and autonomy.
This Article concludes that the evolution of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is appropriate in light of the fact that the technology to be
governed by new legal principles is still rapidly evolving. Moreover,
recent decisions reflect a recurrent concern that the judiciary may overrestrain the government’s ability to address national security issues, such
as terrorist attacks on the home front.50 The virtual and increasingly
comprehensive nature of big data cybersurveillance presents
unprecedented types of society-wide intangible harms. A dramatic
revision of the Fourth Amendment doctrine is now required: abandonment
of the Katz test and the adoption of a cybersurveillance nonintrusion test.

48. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 13, 25–26, 33, 35, 57
(noting references to 1984); see also infra sections II.A. and III.B.
49. See Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 10–11.
50. The issues raised by modern technology’s intersection with the Fourth Amendment are
breathtaking and this Article does not purport to address them comprehensively. For example, the
global dimension of the Internet raises thorny Fourth Amendment questions, including how might the
location of an internet user affect his or her “reasonable expectation of privacy” and how might the
border search doctrine apply in the context of transnational internet use? See Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment and the Global Internet, supra note 5. Similarly, some scholars have turned their attention
to the data territoriality issues that attach to the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, The
Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 328–98 (2015) (exploring the unique features of data
and highlighting the ways in which data undermines longstanding assumptions regarding the link
between data location, and applicable rights and obligations).
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FOURTH AMENDMENT AND CYBERSURVEILLANCE
HARMS

Because of the narrow ground on which the Court resolved Jones, the
case is less interesting for its holding than for the problems with current
Fourth Amendment doctrine that the holding avoided. Part I discusses the
collision of modern forms of cybersurveillance with current Court
doctrine, as epitomized in the Katz test’s protection of expectations of
privacy. Part I begins with a discussion of how the Katz test emerged.
Katz, and the decisions leading up to it, show the Court wrestling with the
question of whether speech and certain forms of surveillance intrusions
should be subject to protection by the Fourth Amendment which,
textually, appears to be concerned with the protection of physical things
or “effects.”51 The decision to evolve Fourth Amendment doctrine to
protect individual expectations of privacy occurred after the Court had
repeatedly confronted developing forms of government surveillance, most
prominently wiretapping, that allowed increased monitoring of private
conversations. Reexamining cases like Katz and its predecessors
demonstrates parallels with the Court’s current predicament. The Court
reluctantly changed Fourth Amendment doctrine in the face of changing
forms of government surveillance. Proponents of the transformation were
concerned about the impacts of such surveillance on democracy, and
opponents worried about judicial intrusion upon the government’s ability
to protect national security.
Next, this Part discusses current cybersurveillance techniques that
enable breathtakingly encompassing surveillance of individuals that do
not appear to offend expectations of privacy as they are understood within
the Katz framework. Given that cybersurveillance means surveillance of
entire sectors of society, rather than of specific individuals, it is necessary
to understand why Katz cannot simply be supplemented, such as with the
“mosaic theory.” Both the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit have
attempted to reconcile Katz with government cybersurveillance. In these
decisions, it is possible to see the competing tensions between a fear of an
Orwellian society and judicial caution about interference with the
Executive branch’s interests in national security. Concerns about national
security often, but not always, permeate cases in which traditional Fourth
Amendment doctrine collides with the big data reality of modern society.
This Part concludes with an examination of Riley v. California, a case in
which national security interests were not salient, where the Court showed
a willingness to alter Fourth Amendment doctrine to protect digital data

51. See infra section I.A.
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from police scrutiny in circumstances where other kinds of data would not
normally be protected.
A.

The Fourth Amendment’s Privacy Doctrine

The following discussion offers a basic overview of the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” protections offered by the Fourth Amendment.
During the Jones oral argument, the Justices conceded that a protection of
reasonable expectations of privacy would not restrain the use of
increasingly comprehensive and invasive data-driven tracking techniques,
which are rapidly evolving. The Justices appeared to signal that the
evolution of these technologies now requires a parallel evolution of the
Fourth Amendment doctrine to keep pace with modern cyberdevelopments.52
The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test emerged in a 1967 case,
United States v. Katz.53 Katz marked a departure from prior Fourth
Amendment doctrine, one that was motivated by the Court’s perceived
need to come to grips with modern government surveillance techniques
that were unrestrained by the Court’s then-current Fourth Amendment
doctrine.54 The technology that concerned the Court was telephone
wiretapping, the most effective form of police eavesdropping at the time.55
The government’s position in Katz was that the Court should simply apply
existing precedent and conclude that eavesdropping had nothing to do
with the concerns protected by the Fourth Amendment.56 The government
relied on two cases as the basis for its position: Olmstead v. United States57
and Goldman v. United States.58
In the 1928 case of Olmstead v. United States, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of extended government surveillance of a massive liquor
bootlegging operation in Washington State.59 The government placed

52. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 3–4.
Chief Justice Roberts: Knotts, though, seems to me much more like traditional surveillance.
You’re following the car, and the beeper just helps you follow it from a—from a slightly greater
distance. That was 30 years ago. The technology is very different, and you get a lot more
information from the GPS surveillance than you do from following a beeper.
Id.
53. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
54. See id. at 353.
55. See id. at 348.
56. See id. at 351–52 (discussing the government’s arguments in the case).
57. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
58. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
59. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455–56.
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wiretaps on phone lines coming from four of the suspects’ residences, as
well as from the operation’s main office; all, the Court noted, “without
trespass on any property of defendants.”60 The Court concluded that this
unauthorized surveillance seemed unproblematic. The Fourth
Amendment protects “material things—the person, the house, his papers,
or his effects,”61 but it did not protect phone calls because a phone
conversation is not a thing and so cannot be searched or seized. Rather
than a search of someone’s effects, wiretapping simply involved “the
sense of hearing and that only,” and one could not construe “the words
search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight.”62 The home itself, and
conversations held therein, are traditionally protected by the Fourth
Amendment.63 But the Court distinguished between phone calls and
internal conversations, explaining that “one who installs in his house a
telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to
those quite outside” and, in doing so, falls outside “the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.”64 Telephone wires merely convey sensory
impressions (sounds) that cannot be seized; and when they are tapped
outside the space of the house, a trespass problem is also avoided.65
In Goldman, the government used a detectaphone: a device that
enhanced a listener’s ability on one side of a wall to hear conversations
on the other side without a physical invasion.66 Although the technology
was different than a wiretap, the Court applied Olmstead and concluded
that eavesdropping falls outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment.67
The petitioners argued, without success, that the absence of a phone
altered the analysis because in Olmstead, the Court had explained that
resorting to a phone involved a choice to project one’s voice to the world
at large.68 The principle that police cannot actually search or seize a
conversation renders the speaker’s intent to keep the conversation within
the private confines of her home irrelevant. To be sure, the Court’s
rejection of petitioner’s argument was more summary, perhaps because
60. Id. at 456–57.
61. Id. at 464.
62. Id. at 464–65.
63. See generally Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
64. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
65. The Court distinguished the question of trespass and the Fourth Amendment, noting that even
if the eavesdropping involved a trespass, that would not mean the police had violated the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 465.
66. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 131 (1942).
67. Id. at 135.
68. Id.
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otherwise it might have had to address why Olmstead bothered to point
out that one assumes any risk of wiretapping in electing to bring a phone
into their house.69
After Goldman, speech fell outside the Fourth Amendment and was
subject to any manner of surveillance without resort to a warrant. It was a
“strange doctrine,” Justice Murphy noted in his dissent, that protected
writings but left vulnerable “the most confidential revelations between
husband and wife, client and lawyer, patient and physician, and penitent
and spiritual advisor” because they were not committed to paper.70
Although Goldman insisted it did not matter if the speech subject to
surveillance was whispered in the bedroom or spoken to a person on the
other side of the country via telephone, the Court was clearly trying to
grapple with an issue created by modern surveillance techniques. If the
Court was only now realizing the oddity of speech being subject to
unrestrained surveillance, even though the Fourth Amendment was more
than a hundred and fifty years old, it was because only in the twentieth
century was technology being developed that made surreptitious
surveillance of conversations feasible and effective. Justice Murphy’s
dissent in Goldman counseled that the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment must be “sufficiently liberal and elastic to make it serve the
needs and manners of each succeeding generation,” and then explained
that a search today no longer requires “physical entry, for science has
brought forth far more effective devices for the invasion of a person’s
privacy than the direct and obvious methods of oppression which were
detested by our forebears and which inspired the Fourth Amendment.”71
Finally, the dissent emphasized “democratic rule” and the need to protect
the individual from being “wholly subordinated to the interests of the
state.”72 Orwellian specters of totalitarianism served as a placeholder
marking a gap between the Court’s current Fourth Amendment doctrine
and the technologies available to the government that are unrestrained by
that doctrine.
Justice Murphy’s dissent in Goldman was consistent with the
dissenting opinions fourteen years earlier in Olmstead.73 Justice Brandeis
noted that: “[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy
have become available to the Government,” and noted that the “progress

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 138–39.
Id. at 142.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928).

1838

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1819

of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not
likely to stop with wire-tapping.”74 Justice Brandeis also resorted to
dramatic rhetoric in emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment must do
more than protect “material things.”75 At stake was “man’s spiritual
nature,” “his feelings,” and “his intellect.”76 Although his pitch to revise
Fourth Amendment doctrine went unheeded in 1928 and was again
rejected by a majority of the Court in 1942, by the 1960s, the Court was
coming to grips with the problem posed by twentieth century surveillance
techniques and more receptive to arguments about the legality of such
surveillance under the Fourth Amendment.
In the 1960 case of Silverman v. United States,77 the Court signaled a
willingness to start restraining government eavesdropping even as it
attempted to do so without significantly altering its current Fourth
Amendment doctrine. In Silverman, the police brought a “spike mike” into
contact with the heating duct of a row house to hear conversations in the
house.78 Olmstead and Goldman appeared to dictate the result, leaving
petitioners to argue that changing technology required overturning those
cases in which technology provided the government with increasingly
effective methods of eavesdropping on private conversations from remote
distances.79 The Court, however, declined to “contemplate the Fourth
Amendment implications of these and other frightening paraphernalia
which the vaunted marvels of an electronic age may visit upon human
society.”80 Instead, the Court held that the police had made “an
unauthorized physical encroachment within a constitutionally protected
area,” an individual’s home, when they brought a microphone into contact
with the house’s heating system.81 In reviewing its prior Fourth
Amendment cases, the Court noted that it had upheld non-trespassory
government surveillance. Although review of Olmstead and Goldman
74. Id. at 473–74. Perhaps presciently, Brandeis speculated about the kinds of pre-crime
technologies I have discussed elsewhere: “[a]dvances in the psychic and related sciences may bring
means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.” Id. at 474. See, e.g., Hu, Small Data
Surveillance, supra note 4, at 803 (describing how preemptive action may appear to be justified in
the eyes of the government in certain situations); Hu, Taxonomy of the Snowden Disclosures, supra
note 4, at 1684 (explaining how surveillance in day-to-day governance activities is often justified by
pre-crime objectives).
75. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.
76. Id.
77. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
78. Id. at 506–07.
79. Id. at 508–09.
80. Id. at 509.
81. Id. at 510–12.
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arguably provide no basis to conclude that the Court’s observations on the
question of trespass were integral to the Fourth Amendment holding.82 In
Silverman, conversations were still not “things” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, but there were now “constitutionally protected
areas,” and if the government’s surveillance physically intruded into such
an area, the surveillance offended the Fourth Amendment.83
Silverman’s emphasis on physical intrusion did not survive long. Seven
years later, the Court was ready to reestablish its Fourth Amendment
doctrine on a new basis.84 Katz involved government surveillance of a
phone call made in a public phone booth. The parties, taking their cue
from Silverman, attempted to argue that the phone booth was analogous
to a home or some other “constitutionally protected area,”85 but the Court
abruptly dismissed this approach.86
In Katz, the Court brought the spoken word within the scope of
protection of the Fourth Amendment.87 The government, relying on the
Court’s jurisprudence, contended that because there was no physical
intrusion on the phone booth—only electronic monitoring—there was no
Fourth Amendment problem. The Court flatly rejected that formulation
and instead offered up the reasonable expectation of privacy test.88
The Court explained that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his home or office,” is without constitutional protection,
“[b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.”89 The Court rejected the
notion that a person placing a phone call in a glass phone booth had
surrendered constitutional protections because he was visible as he made
the call.90 What was relevant was his expectation that his words were
shielded from being heard by third parties. Then, embracing the dissents
82. Id. at 509–10.
83. Id. at 512.
84. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
85. Id. at 349.
86. The Court dismissed this approach, deriding the notion that “the correct solution of Fourth
Amendment problems” can be “promoted by incantation of the phrase ‘constitutionally protected
area,’” id. at 350, but in fairness to the parties, they were only taking their cue from Silverman. Until
Katz, eavesdropping by any means did not offend the Fourth Amendment unless it involved intrusion
on a “constitutionally protected area.” Id.
87. Id. at 353.
88. Id. at 350 (rejecting the parties’ formulation); id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (reading the
majority opinion as holding that “a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy”).
89. Id. at 351–52 (majority opinion).
90. Id. at 352.
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in Olmstead and Goldman, the Court explained that Fourth Amendment
protections must change as technology changes: “To read the Constitution
more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come
to play in private communication.”91
It is, however, Justice Harlan’s concurrence that set forth the test
commonly associated with Katz. It is a two-prong test: “first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.”92 The
second prong of the test requires “the expectation [of privacy] be one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”93 Thus, Justice Harlan
noted that while a telephone booth is a public place, the act of closing the
door establishes an expectation of privacy on the part of the individual
entering the booth, and society views this expectation as reasonable.94
The Court acknowledged that in the past, it had required “searches and
seizures of tangible property” as a prerequisite to finding a Fourth
Amendment violation.95 Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, noted that the
trespass doctrine had become outdated and no longer suited to the realities
of modern life in 1967 because surveillance and intrusion could be
accomplished without physical intrusion: “[i]ts limitation on Fourth
Amendment protection is, in the present day, bad physics as well as bad
law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic
as well as physical invasion.”96
Thus, in place of the trespass doctrine, Katz left a more flexible
reasonable expectation of privacy test that effectively protected against
government intrusion, physical or otherwise, so long as those subject to
surveillance intended to keep their affairs private.97 In response to the new
test, Justice Black’s dissent decried an expansion of the reach of the
Amendment beyond its textual limitations and the arrogation of the Court
of “omnipotent lawmaking authority,” which “is dangerous to freedom.”98
Related to this familiar originalist complaint arises a new theme, which
remains in play in recent court decisions grappling with big data
surveillance: judicial uncertainty regarding national security implications.
To the extent the Court interposes the Fourth Amendment as a restraint
on government surveillance in the name of democracy, the government
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 352–53 (majority opinion).
Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 374 (Black, J., dissenting).
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can restrain the Court by invoking the need for national security and its
own obligation to protect democracy. In a footnote, the Katz Court
reserved the question of whether a warrant would be required where
national security was implicated.99 Justice White’s concurrence went
further, stating that warrant procedures should not apply where the
President or the Attorney General believe electronic surveillance is
reasonable for national security purposes.100 Justice Douglas (joined by
Justice Brennan) in turn concurred to address Justice White and argue that
the President and Attorney General cannot be trusted to decide when
Fourth Amendment protections should or should not apply to persons
accused of treasonous activity.101 This debate was not relevant to the
holding in Katz, but served to remind members of the Court that Fourth
Amendment doctrine implicates national security concerns.
This narrative of how Katz came to be is relevant because the same
dynamic is in play again today. At the time Katz was decided, the new test
seemed much more expansive than the one it supplanted. But in the
modern context of 24/7, 360-degree cybersurveillance and dataveillance,
there have been a number of calls to again update the Fourth Amendment
test to reflect our times.102
It is against this historical backdrop that this Article turns to Jones. The
decision in Jones is most noteworthy for the fact that it evaded the
troubling issues that vexed the Court. In this respect, Jones hearkens back
to Silverman. In both cases, the Court was troubled by the notion that
contemporary surveillance techniques were unrestrained by the Fourth
Amendment and, in both cases, the Court balked from attempting to
refashion its Fourth Amendment doctrine; instead, it found a more limited
basis for finding the Fourth Amendment was violated on the facts before
it. In both cases, the court’s decision rested on a physical trespass.103
Jones’s oral argument is equally worth considering because it
demonstrates the same dynamic that was present in the cases leading to,
and including, Katz. The Court evidences a growing restlessness with the
current Fourth Amendment doctrine’s impotence in the face of
99. Id. at 358 n.23 (majority opinion) (“Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a
magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is not a
question presented by this case.”).
100. Id. at 364 (White, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 359–60 (Douglas, J., concurring).
102. See supra note 5.
103. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (explaining that a physical intrusion
by the Government into private property constitutes a Fourth Amendment search); Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (emphasizing that the decision finding that a search occurred
is “based upon the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area”).
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increasingly comprehensive techniques of government surveillance. The
references to 1984 in the oral argument serve to underscore the potency
of deeply ingrained cultural norms regarding the appropriate limits on
government intrusiveness in an age when technological innovation is
rapidly changing the government’s capacities. The substantial rhetorical
force of 1984 nearly assured a government defeat in Jones. In effect, this
result illuminated the “cultural software” embedded within the Fourth
Amendment’s “doctrinal hardware.”104
B.

Limits of the Fourth Amendment Mosaic Theory

It appears that the Court today is in much the same place as it was fifty
years ago prior to the Katz decision. Jones represents one of the Court’s
closest engagements with the constitutionality of emerging ubiquitous
tracking technologies. GPS technology enables surveillance through 24/7
data collection.105 A GPS device transmits geospatial data that captures
current locations multiple times per minute for as long as the device is left
in place. Once a GPS device is installed, it automatically collects data
without the need for any law enforcement intervention. This technology
enables authorities to pinpoint the precise location of the device at any
given time with minimal effort and resource expenditure.106
The comprehensive scale of such data collection is what appears to
have led to the lower court in Jones, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,
holding that the detailed data trail recorded constitutes a Fourth
Amendment violation by allowing the government to capture the entire
mosaic of the suspect’s activities, rather than the mere tile of the suspect’s
potential criminal activity.107 In the wake of Jones, constitutional scholars
have shown interest in the mosaic theory employed by the D.C. Circuit.108
104. See generally J. M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1998)
(contending that the metaphor of cultural software opens a way for moving beyond entrenched
perspectives and provides a more productive approach to theorizing ideology).
105. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 403; supra note 45 (discussing United States v. Carpenter, a case
challenging law enforcement warrantless use of cell-site geolocational data, recently granted certiorari
by the Supreme Court).
106. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 403.
107. See United Sates v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 554 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
108. For a detailed discussion on the mosaic theory, see Kerr, Mosaic Theory, supra note 5, at 313
(discussing the United States v. Jones decision on GPS surveillance in the context of digital “mosaic
theory”). Under the digital mosaic theory, courts evaluate the collective, aggregated whole of a
surveillance sequence to determine whether the surveillance activity is properly construed as a search.
Id. Kerr concludes courts should reject the theory as unworkable. Id. at 346 (“[T]he theory raises so
many novel and puzzling questions that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to administer
effectively as technology changes.”); see also Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking Out of Fourth
Amendment Dead Ends: United States v. Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2012);
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Under the mosaic theory, as articulated by the D.C. Circuit, acquisition of
information that would not ordinarily be a Fourth Amendment search
under Katz can transform into a search when the information collected is
considered in the aggregate.109 When subject to aggregation in the hands
of the government, the mosaic of data may reveal an all-encompassing
picture of an individual’s private life as it is pieced together through an
unrelenting survey of that individual’s public movements and
appearances. That mosaic, according the D.C. Circuit, must be subject to
Fourth Amendment protection.110 Despite this lower court precedent, the
Jones Court declined to follow this “digital mosaic theory” of the Fourth
Amendment.111
The Court in Jones struggled to find a new approach to the privacy
doctrine.112 For whatever efficacy the mosaic theory has in the context of
bringing GPS surveillance within the shadow of the Fourth Amendment,
it has severe shortcomings when brought to bear on the kinds of big data
cybersurveillance methods unearthed by the Snowden disclosures. The
mosaic theory is premised upon a small data world. In a small data world,
a traditional notion of surveillance involves the tailing and tracking of an
individual. In a big data world, the tailing and tracking of entire
populations is now constant and effortless. Meanwhile, the big data

David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the
Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381 (2013); Gray & Citron,
Quantitative Privacy, supra note 5; Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and Historical Location
Surveillance After United States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803 (2013); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations
of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205;
Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A
Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2012); Benjamin
Wittes, Databuse: Digital Privacy and the Mosaic, GOV. STUDS., BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 1, 2011),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/04/01-databuse-wittes [https://perma.cc/XG99-6A
HS].
109. See Kerr, Mosaic Theory, supra note 5, at 313.
110. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563–64 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
111. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (emphasizing that the Fourth
Amendment violation was a physical occupation of “private property for the purpose of obtaining
information”). But see Kerr, Mosaic Theory, supra note 5, at 311, 326–29, 344 (contending that there
are five votes on the Supreme Court ready to adopt the mosaic theory under the Fourth Amendment
and then addressing why this might be a mistake because such an approach “would require courts to
answer a long list of novel and challenging questions” and because courts should “retain the traditional
sequential approach to Fourth Amendment analysis”).
112. See generally BALKIN, supra note 104 (arguing that using the metaphor of cultural software
to describe the tools of understanding opens a way for moving beyond entrenched perspectives and
provides a more productive account of critical theory).
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cybersurveillance techniques described above do not focus on individuals.
They harvest data in mass quantities and preserve it.113
The effectiveness of big data cybersurveillance depends upon an everwidening harvest of data without regard to specific individuals at the time
of collection. As explained by the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Ira “Gus” Hunt, “the value of any
[piece] of information is only known when you can connect it with
something else that arrives at a future point in time.”114 Because “you
can’t connect dots you don’t have, it drives us into a mode of, we
fundamentally try to collect everything and hang on to it forever.”115 As
the Second Circuit noted of this “vast new technological capacity for
large-scale and automated review and analysis” of data harvested through
surveillance, “[t]he more metadata the government collects and
analyzes, . . . the greater the capacity for such metadata to reveal ever
more private and previously unascertainable information about
individuals.”116
The mosaic theory, however, does not speak to this kind of big data
cybersurveillance. The mosaic under consideration by the D.C. Circuit in
Jones had as its centerpiece an individual whose life was gradually being
subjected to datafication through automated 24/7 geolocational
surveillance. Stephen Leckar, representing Antoine Jones, explained to
the Justices during the oral argument of Jones that the collection of his
client’s geolocation data through warrantless GPS tracking was the search
and seizure of data.117 While it was certainly a departure from what is
conventionally understood as a search—given that it was conducted by
means of simply accumulating data on Mr. Jones’s whereabouts over the
course of twenty-eight days thanks to a (comparatively antiquated) GPS
113. See, e.g., Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, supra note 4, at 834
(describing how the government justifies retaining all data gathered, regardless of its apparent law
enforcement value); see also DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW (2007);
Andrejevic, Surveillance in the Big Data Era, supra note 3; Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical
Questions for Big Data, 15 INF. COMM. & SOC. 662 (2012); Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology
and Dataveillance, 31 COMM. OF THE ACM 498 (1988); Julie E. Cohen, The Surveillance-Innovation
Complex: The Irony of the Participatory Turn, in THE PARTICIPATORY CONDITION IN THE DIGITAL
AGE (Darin Barney et al. eds., 2016); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable
Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327 (2015); Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, supra note 2.
114. See, e.g., Ira “Gus” Hunt, Chief Technology Officer of the Central Intelligence Agency,
Presentation at GigaOM Structure: Data Conference: The CIA’s “Grand Challenges” with Big Data
(Mar. 20, 2013, 10:27 AM), https://gigaom.com/2013/03/20/even-the-cia-is-struggling-to-deal-withthe-volume-of-real-time-social-data [https://perma.cc/HLV6-Y7T7].
115. Id.
116. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 794 (2d Cir. 2015).
117. See Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16.
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device—it was still a search within what might be called the small data
paradigm. Antoine Jones was targeted by authorities who used a GPS
device to transform his daily movements into analyzable data. Big data
cybersurveillance, however, does not pursue individuals for the sake of
accumulating data. It accumulates data to ensure that all individuals are
pursued. The big data horizontal collection of data118 under mass
cybersurveillance, allowing wide sweeps of “digital dossier” files to be
kept on an entire population, facilitates the government to flip the files to
the vertical collection of data (e.g., initiating an investigation where the
government drills down on a particular suspect) at any given moment.
Hunt expressed it poignantly: in traditional surveillance, you “move
data to the question.”119 Thus, the police have a question about whether a
suspect is connected to a drug ring (e.g., Antoine Jones, as a suspected
drug dealer). Law enforcement then must “move data to the question” by
now accumulating data about the suspect (vertical collection of data in a
small data world). In Jones, the government accumulated geolocational
data through GPS tracking to analyze the accumulated data to answer the
guiding question: is Mr. Jones involved in a drug ring?
By contrast, with big data, you “move the question to the data.” Big
data does not monitor and track individuals; it creates vast databases
which remain available to authorities with questions about individuals as
a resource, and the records can be detained potentially indefinitely. All
individuals are suspects, and authorities possess the prerogative to consult
any particular suspect’s aggregated data at any given time (e.g.,
investigators can flip an inquiry from a horizontal investigation to a
vertical investigation of a data profile at any given moment). The
database, data screening protocol, algorithmic analysis, etc., can yield a
profile that aids an official in answering an investigatory question.120
Because the algorithmic-based determination or database search protocol
is created without reference to specific individuals, there may not be a
governmental need to undertake a surveillance operation to create a
mosaic of the sort accumulated in Jones.121 Rather, with big data
cybersurveillance, the objectionable mosaic in Fourth Amendment terms
118. See Matt Sledge, CIA’s Gus Hunt on Big Data: We ‘Try To Collect Everything and Hang On
To It Forever,’ HUFFPOST TECH. (Mar. 20, 2013 4:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/03/20/cia-gus-hunt-big-data_n_2917842.html [https://perma.cc/ASY8-VWHC] (Power Point
presentation by CIA Chief Technology Officer Ira “Gus” Hunt at GigaOM’s Structure Data
Conference on March 20, 2013).
119. Id.
120. See generally Big Data and the Future of Privacy, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (2014),
http://epic.org/privacy/big-data/ [https://perma.cc/B6WX-PKTW].
121. See Kerr, Mosaic Theory, supra note 5.
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can be constituted simply through a government-initiated data search
through personally identifiable information harvested in other contexts
where there appeared to be no Fourth Amendment concerns.122
This reversal—moving the question to the data rather than moving the
data to the question—is paradigmatic. In other words, the government has
the capacity to accumulate data on everything and everyone merely in
anticipation of its relevance to future questions, rather than accumulating
data in response to a present question. This is consistent with the growing
interest in preemptive cybersurveillance to serve anticipatory crime
prevention goals through precrime programs that purport to identify
criminals before a crime has occurred.123 In that case, what may start as a
data pattern emerging from a sea of data becomes a specific individual.
The individual, in turn, becomes the site of an intervention by authorities
for the purpose of preventing a criminal or terrorist act.124 It is not clear
how the Fourth Amendment applies to this mode of law enforcement,
which is why a dramatic revision of the doctrine is now necessary. If the
proponents of big data can translate the accumulation of “unthinkably
large” sets of data into precrime enforcement actions (statistical and
probabilistic certainty that an individual will commit a crime or act of
terrorism), how will the Fourth Amendment and other constitutional
protections respond?

122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Ian Kerr, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: The Path of Law After the
Computational Turn, in PRIVACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL TURN: THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW MEETS THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 112 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Katja de Vries eds.,
2013) (contending that predictive technologies facilitate a philosophy of pre-emption that shifts ex
post facto systems of punishment to ex ante systems of prevention in a way that threatens due process);
David Cole, The Difference Prevention Makes: Regulating Preventive Justice, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL.
501, 503 (2014) (describing how threat risk assessments will attempt to predict criminal or terroristic
predisposition); Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints, supra note 13, at 331 (stating that many pre-crime
constraints are less comprehensive but impose considerable and often underappreciated costs on the
targeted individual regardless); Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, supra note
113, at 351 (contending that law enforcement already uses predictive policing technology to predict
areas of crime, but that big data will predict actions and possibly individual behavior); Elizabeth E.
Joh, Policing by the Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 56 (2014)
(questioning whether predictive software based on historical crime data is comparable to other uses
of third party information that have previously been held to justify a reasonable suspicion
determination); see also Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: How Big
Data Threatens Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 66 (2013); Mark L. Noferi &
Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk Assessment, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 45 (2015).
124. See, e.g., Cole, The Difference Prevention Makes, supra note 123, at 501 (explaining that mass
surveillance is increasingly deployed to prevent crime and terrorism before it occurs and describing
how preventative policing is utilized).
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The Need for a New Fourth Amendment Test

The Katz test currently invites the federal judiciary to evaluate the
constitutionality of emerging cybersurveillance technologies, programs,
and protocols on an individual, case-by-case basis, and to evaluate
whether a particular individual’s privacy interests were harmed. Each
time, the analysis centers on an individualized, personally subjective point
of view: did this person have a reasonable expectation of privacy?
Under post-Katz precedent such as United States v. Miller,125 United
States v. Knotts,126 and other cases, scholars have noted that the Katz test
is no longer workable in light of emerging technologies.127 Modern
cybersurveillance offers the government tools that should not be
construed as simply sensory-enhancing, such as the beeper in Knotts, or
access to documents already provided to a third party, such as the bank
records at issue in Miller. In 1979, in a footnote in Smith v. Maryland,128
the Court contemplated that there might come a day when the Katz test
could fail:
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz’ twopronged inquiry would provide an inadequate index of Fourth
Amendment protection. For example, if the Government were
suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes
henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals
thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of
privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects. Similarly, if a
refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this Nation’s
traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously
monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation
of privacy regarding the contents of his calls might be lacking as
well. In such circumstances, where an individual’s subjective
expectations had been “conditioned: by influences alien to wellrecognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective
expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in
ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection

125. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
126. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
127. See, e.g., Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, supra note 5, at 1511–12 (applying the
Katz test to contemporary Fourth Amendment challenges); Slobogin, supra note 31, at 11–31
(describing how existing precedent is no longer workable given technological advances); Wittes,
Databuse: Digital Privacy and the Mosaic, supra note 108, at 2 (arguing that past conceptions of
privacy have become obsolete).
128. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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was. In determining whether a “legitimate expectation of privacy”
existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be proper.129
During oral argument in Jones, several Justices appeared ready to
contemplate the type of re-visioning of Katz that Smith v. Maryland
suggested might be needed one day.130 Justices Alito and Sotomayor, in
their concurrences in Jones, made clear their beliefs that new
technologies, and the cybersurveillance consequences of these new
technologies, require such a revision in the modern age.131
Moreover, a revision is particularly urgent in light of the fact that the
“Third Party Doctrine” has left Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
ambiguous in the post-Snowden age. The Third Party Doctrine exempts
from Fourth Amendment protection information provided by an
individual to a third party: an individual lacks a reasonable expectation of
privacy under Katz once information is shared with another entity.132
The ambiguity of what Fourth Amendment protections may be
appropriate as applied to NSA cybersurveillance, and how the courts
should test this protection, was borne out in two split decisions in

129. Id. at 740 n.5.
130. See Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 24. Justice Ginsburg
said:
[T]he Fourth Amendment says—or it has been interpreted to mean that if I’m on a public bus
and the police want to feel my luggage, that’s a violation; and yet, this kind of monitoring,
installing the GPS and monitoring the person’s movement whenever they are outside their house
in the car, is not? I mean, it just—something about it that—just doesn’t parse.
Id.
Justice Breyer said “Start—what would a democratic society look like if a large number of people did
think that the government was tracking their every movement over long periods of time.” Id. Justice
Kagan said:
I mean, if you think about this, and you think about a little robotic device following you around
24 hours a day anyplace you go that’s not your home, reporting in all your movements to the
police, to investigative authorities, the notion that we don’t have an expectation of privacy in
that, the notion that we don’t think that our privacy interests would be violated by this robotic
device, I’m—I’m not sure how one can say that.
Id. at 57–58.
131. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Alito
concurred:
In addition, the Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a
well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But technology can change those
expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations
are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes. New technology
may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may
find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy
that new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as
inevitable.
Id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
132. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
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Klayman v. Obama133 and ACLU v. Clapper134 in December 2013.135
Shortly following the Snowden disclosures, the ACLU filed a lawsuit
challenging the NSA’s bulk telephony data collection in ACLU v. Clapper
in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York. Larry Klayman,
founder of Freedom Watch, filed a similar lawsuit challenging the NSA’s
bulk telephony data collection in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia.136
The Snowden disclosures of June 2013 revealed that a “bulk telephony
metadata program” had been operated for the past seven years pursuant to
section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, and had allowed for the suspicionless
and indiscriminate metadata surveillance of all U.S. citizens and residents
impacted by the program.137 Specifically, this program allowed for the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to compel telecommunications
companies to produce telephony metadata (calls to and from subscribers,
length of call, etc.) on all calls made by any subscriber, including U.S.
citizens, on an ongoing, daily basis. On December 27, 2013, United States
District Judge William H. Pauley III in the Southern District of New York,
an appointee of President Clinton, upheld the constitutionality of the
program in ACLU v. Clapper.138 Judge Pauley relied upon the Third Party
Doctrine, claiming that telephone metadata had been shared with phone
providers and thus, the plaintiffs could not claim a reasonable expectation
of privacy under the Katz privacy test: “[t]he collection of breathtaking
amounts of information unprotected by the Fourth Amendment does not
transform that sweep into a Fourth Amendment search.”139 In doing so, he
echoed Justice Black’s dissent in Katz, refusing to depart from settled
doctrine to construe a conversation as something that could be “searched”
or “seized” by the government.140 Judge Pauley was now only applying
and refusing to depart from the reasoning of Katz.
Another judge, facing the same legal issue, evidenced restlessness with
Katz. Less than two weeks earlier, on December 16, 2013, United States
District Judge Richard J. Leon in the District of Columbia came to the

133. 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
134. 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 785 F.3d
787, 821 (2d Cir. 2015).
135. For a more complete listing of the litigation surrounding bulk surveillance, see supra note 30.
136. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 11.
137. See, e.g., GREENWALD, supra note 1.
138. 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
139. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 752.
140. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 366–67 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
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opposite result in Klayman v. Obama,141 finding the NSA program
unconstitutional. Although the facts of each case were identical, Judge
Leon, unlike Judge Pauley, did not find that the Third Party Doctrine of
Smith v. Maryland was controlling. Rather, Judge Leon used an
“Orwellian” standard to infuse the Katz privacy test and the Fourth
Amendment with normative force and cultural weight.142 By reasoning
that the NSA program presented an “Orwellian” technology of
surveillance, Judge Leon held that a reasonable expectation of privacy had
been violated.
In this manner, Judge Leon interpreted the Fourth Amendment through
a customary law standard. In other words, in line with Judge Leon’s
reasoning in Klayman, “the lawful privacy interests of
individuals . . . individuals’ ‘reasonable expectations of privacy’—
depend on the interests that society recognizes through law and
custom.”143 Judge Pauley, in contrast, did not appear to consider a
customary law dimension of the Fourth Amendment. Judge Leon
recognized that Katz and subsequent precedent based on it mandated the
result arrived at by Judge Pauley, but concluded that such “reasonable
expectation” analysis lead to a starkly unreasonable result when placed in
the modern context of the “almost-Orwellian technology” available to the
government.144
Katz precedent suggested that an individual could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, largely because the data collected by the bulk
telephony metadata program had already been shared with third parties
and thus effectually disclosed. But ratifying that result at the second stage
of the analysis leads to implications that summon the Orwellian rhetoric
that increasingly finds its way into Fourth Amendment cases. Judge Leon,
quoting Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones, noted that in effect “some
may assume that these cultural changes will force people to ‘reconcile
themselves’ to an ‘inevitable’ diminution of privacy that new technology
entails.”145 Judge Leon then reversed course, and starting from the second
Katz step, concluded such an Orwellian result was itself unreasonable,

141. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32, vacated and remanded, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“I
believe that bulk telephony metadata collection and analysis almost certainly does violate a reasonable
expectation of privacy.”).
142. Id. at 33.
143. Nita Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1241 (2012); see also Naomi
Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 35–67 (2001).
144. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 33.
145. Id. at 35 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito,
J., concurring)).
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explaining: “I think it is more likely that these trends have resulted in a
greater expectation of privacy and a recognition that society views that
expectation as reasonable.”146
One cannot expect that what they disclose to others is private. But one
can expect that what one discloses to the public will still be shielded from
government surveillance in the form of constant collection and indefinite
retention.147 Judge Leon departed from controlling Supreme Court
precedent by arguing that the disclosed information surveilled was
qualitatively different because it was quantitatively different: “[b]ut the
ubiquity of phones has dramatically altered the quantity of information
that is now available and, more importantly, what that information can tell
the government about people’s lives.”148 Is this departure principled?
When does an unreasonable expectation of privacy for publicly disclosed
data become reasonable? At what point does a quantitative difference in
lawful data surveillance become a qualitative difference that renders it
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny?149 Judge Leon reasoned that the
Third Party Doctrine was leading the federal court to an Orwellian tipping
point where the underlying logic of the reasonable expectation of privacy
test of Katz becomes unreasonable:
When do present-day circumstances—the evolutions in the
Government’s surveillance capabilities, citizens’ phone habits,
and the relationship between the NSA and telecom companies—
become so thoroughly unlike those considered by the Supreme
Court thirty-four years ago that a precedent like Smith simply
does not apply? The answer, unfortunately for the Government,
is now.150

146. Id. at 36 (emphasis in original).
147. See, e.g., id. at 35–37 (contending that cultural changes have resulted in a greater expectation
of privacy that is viewed as reasonable by modern societal standards).
148. Id. at 35–36 (emphasis in original).
149. See, e.g., Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2479, 2489 (2014) (explaining that
because of their function, storage capacity, and cloud access, “[c]ell phones differ in both a
quantitative and qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person”);
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (pointing out that
GPS surveillance “generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that
reflects a wealth of detail” about that person’s various associations); United States v. Cotterman, 709
F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (discussing the qualitative and quantitative distinctions in
digital data and storage in comparison); see also Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, supra note
50, at 365–69; Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, supra note 2, at 871–72; Gray & Citron,
Quantitative Privacy, supra note 5, at 65–68.
150. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 31 (D.D.C. 2013) (emphasis in original), vacated and
remanded, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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Judge Leon’s opinion was daring but did not survive review by the D.C.
Circuit, which overturned the district court’s grant of a preliminary
injunction based on standing concerns.151 Judge Pauley’s Katz analysis,
however, similarly failed to survive review by the Second Circuit, which
reversed and remanded on the grounds that the government’s bulk
telephony surveillance was not authorized by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001.152 Although the Second Circuit invoked the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance and expressly declined to reach plaintiffs’ Fourth
Amendment claim, the court was not reticent about expressing doubts
regarding Katz’s continued applicability in modern times, suggesting, like
Judge Leon, that we may have reached an Orwellian tipping point and
looking to Congress for guidance with regard to whether the Katz test
remained reasonable.153 Unpacking the Second Circuit’s thoughts on this
matter helps to sharpen the contours of the Fourth Amendment dilemma
raised by big data surveillance.
Again, the court conceded that Katz did not protect publicly disclosed
metadata: “[w]e recognize that metadata exist in more traditional formats,
too, and that law enforcement and others have always been able to utilize
metadata for investigative purposes.”154 Quantitative increases in the
scope of surveillance leads to qualitative differences: “[b]ut the structured
format of telephone and other technology-related metadata, and the vast
new technological capacity for large-scale and automated review and
analysis, distinguish the type of metadata at issue here from more
traditional forms.”155 Because modern data trails left by individuals are so
much more comprehensive, the sphere of an individual’s subjective
expectation of privacy is radically reduced: “[s]uch expansive
development of government repositories of formerly private records
would be an unprecedented contraction of the privacy expectations of all
Americans.”156 The court elsewhere elaborated on the theme of Katz’s
potential obsolescence:
[T]he very notion of an individual’s expectation of privacy,
considered in Katz a key component of the rights protected by the
151. Klayman, 800 F.3d at 561.
152. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821 (2d Cir. 2015).
153. Id. at 826 (“In light of the asserted national security interests at stake, we deem it prudent to
pause to allow an opportunity for debate in Congress that may (or may not) profoundly alter the legal
landscape.”).
154. Id. at 794.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 818.
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Fourth Amendment, may seem quaint in a world in which
technology makes it possible for individuals and businesses (to
say nothing of the government) to observe acts of individuals
once regarded as protected from public view.157
And the reach of the government’s eye appeared to be unprecedented:
“the bulk collection of data as to essentially the entire population of the
United States, something inconceivable before the advent of high-speed
computers, permits the development of a government database with a
potential for invasions of privacy unimaginable in the past.”158 The court
further noted that the question of whether such warrantless surveillance
by the government may be permissible “seem[s] much more threatening
as the extent of such [personal] information [subject to surveillance]
grows.”159 Like Judge Leon, the court noted that this state of affairs has
brought emerging surveillance developments to that Orwellian tipping
point where the viability of Katz must be addressed.160
The Second Circuit held, but only for standing purposes, that collecting
metadata in a database amounts to a seizure for Fourth Amendment
purposes.161 It expressed uncertainty about whether judicial restraint was
appropriate given the national security concerns the government cited as
the justification for the mass surveillance. The court noted that perhaps a
radical diminution of privacy was warranted “by national security needs
in the face of the dangers of contemporary domestic and international
terrorism.”162 Thus, the same uncertainty that appeared in Katz over how
revising Fourth Amendment doctrine may impinge national security
manifests as Katz appears increasingly on the verge of undergoing its own
judicial revision. The Second Circuit was, in effect, attempting to balance
traditional expectations of privacy understood as protected by the Fourth
Amendment with the Executive’s need for a free hand in matters affecting
national security, and it looked to Congress to resolve the dilemma: “[t]he
endorsement of the Legislative Branch of government provides some
degree of comfort in the face of concerns about the reasonableness of the
government’s assertions of the necessity of the data collection.”163 Thus,
like Judge Leon, the Second Circuit analyzed the two-step Katz test,
157. Id. at 822 (emphasis in original).
158. Id. at 824.
159. Id. at 822–23.
160. Id. at 823 (observing that in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983), the Supreme
Court opined that “if . . . dragnet type law enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur, there
will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable”).
161. Id. at 801.
162. Id. at 818.
163. Id. at 824.
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largely concluding that the first step is no longer tenable because the
“expectation of privacy” defined in Katz’s terms collapses in the context
of modern, technologically dependent daily life and, in the second step,
changed the question to inquire whether society should ratify the current
state of affairs—whether Katz itself is “reasonable” anymore. Or, more
precisely, the question is whether the contemporary sweep of government
surveillance, permitted by Katz, is itself reasonable. The Court punted the
question to Congress:
A congressional judgment as to what is ‘reasonable’ under current
circumstances would carry weight—at least with us, and, we
assume, with the Supreme Court as well—in assessing whether
[big data surveillance techniques] render obsolete the third-party
records doctrine or, conversely, reduce our expectations of
privacy and make more intrusive techniques both expected and
necessary to deal with new kinds of threats.164
The national security justification165 calls into question whether the
judiciary has the competence to “update” the Fourth Amendment in the
name of preserving its relevance. Resort to Congress provides an avenue
of interrogating the Executive’s potentially self-serving representations of
the need for surveillance in the face of modern threats. Indeed, Justice
Douglas’ concurrence in Katz opposed a “wholly unwarranted green light
for the Executive Branch to resort to electronic eavesdropping without a
warrant” where national security was involved because that Branch
cannot be trusted to restrain itself.166 That is not because the Executive is
disingenuous, but because by constitutional design, “the Executive
Branch is not supposed to be neutral and disinterested” and thus a
magistrate is needed to determine when such surveillance is justified.167
Near the end of Clapper, Judge Lynch’s majority opinion for the Second
Circuit developed the same theme, arguing that reconciling the public
interest in privacy with the government’s need for surveillance is a task
involving “all three branches of government.”168 In his Clapper
concurrence, Judge Sack cautioned that the adversarial system of most

164. Id. at 824–25.
165. See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing
justification for bulk telephony metadata collection under statutory framework and how Congress
remains informed regarding foreign intelligence surveillance); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d
1, 43 (D.D.C. 2013) (discussing balance between the national security interests of the United States
and the individual liberties of citizens), vacated and remanded, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
166. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 359–60 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 359.
168. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 826 (2d Cir. 2015).
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courts might bolster the FISC’s ability to objectively interrogate
government representations about the need for surveillance rather than
functioning largely as a rubber stamp.169 Nevertheless, Judge Sack’s
concurrence emphasized that Congress must take the lead in determining
the propriety of the growing government surveillance capacity.170
Judge Leon, meanwhile, after remand from the D.C. Circuit, held in
2015 that plaintiffs, by amending their complaint to add new plaintiffs,
had cured their standing problem and once again granted a preliminary
injunction (which was almost immediately vacated by the D.C. Circuit).171
In the 2015 opinion, Judge Leon acknowledged the Second Circuit’s view
that Congress should take the lead in determining what was “reasonable”
for purposes of revising Fourth Amendment doctrine, and countered with
a much more robust view of the judiciary’s responsibility to address
constitutional violations where it finds them.172 As Judge Leon explained:
“this Court cannot, and will not, sit idle in the face of likely constitutional
violations for fear that it might be viewed as meddling with the decision
of a legislative branch that lacked the political will, or votes, to expressly
and unambiguously authorize the Program for another six months.”173
Even in his 2013 decision, Judge Leon had explained that his task was
“the latest chapter in the Judiciary’s continuing challenge to balance the
national security interests of the United States with the individual liberties
of our citizens.”174
As discussed above, Katz involved surveillance of criminal activity
and, as a sub-current, the Justices debated the implications of their
groundbreaking holding on national security.175 For Judge Leon, that
debate is not one in which the separation of powers doctrine calls for a
collaborative effort. Rather, it plays out in the context of the Supreme
Court’s “special needs” doctrine.176 That line of cases creates an exception
to the general rule that “warrantless searches ‘are per se unreasonable

169. Id. at 831 (Sack, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 832 (“[I]t is Congress that must decide in the first instance under what circumstance the
government can obtain data touching upon conflicting national security and personal privacy
interests.”).
171. Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172, 198 (D.D.C. 2015), vacated and remanded, 800
F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also supra note 30.
172. See Klayman, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 183 n.12.
173. Id. (emphasis in original).
174. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 43 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded, 800 F.3d
559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
175. See supra notes 165–170 and accompanying text.
176. See Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 37–42.
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under the Fourth Amendment.’”177 Such cases arise where there is a
special need for the government to proceed without a warrant, and in
determining that such a warrantless search is proper, courts weigh the
privacy interest compromised against the character of the government’s
intrusion as well as the need for and efficacy of the search.178 Thus, having
gone beyond Katz and found the collection of bulk metadata to constitute
a search, Judge Leon then had to determine whether the government
needed a warrant for such a search or whether national security concerns
drew the bulk telephony metadata program within the ambit of the special
needs doctrine.
As Judge Leon noted, there were already a number of cases in which
the special needs doctrine had permitted searches to confront terrorist
threats.179 Had Judge Leon been drawing and relying upon such
conclusions outside the context of the special needs analysis, he would
have been at the very limits of, if not beyond, the judiciary’s competence.
The special needs doctrine, and the government’s resort to it as a last line
of defense, allowed Judge Leon to apply the law to facts, resulting in
findings about the efficacy of the bulk telephony program in combatting
terrorism. Yet, the government could not establish special need here
because it could not establish “that a terrorist attack has ever been
prevented because searching the NSA database was faster than other
investigative tactics.”180
D.

Big Data and the Fourth Amendment Outside the National Security
Context

Much of Judge Leon’s reasoning about modern expectations of privacy
in the context of a big data society is echoed in the Supreme Court’s recent
decision of Riley v. California. There, applying a comparable exception
to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, the Court had to balance
a person’s privacy interest in the data stored on a cell phone against the
government’s interest in such data when found in the possession of an
arrested suspect.181 The Court was receptive to arguments that big data is
different, and altered existing precedent that suggested that anything on

177. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (emphasis in original).
178. See Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 38.
179. Id. at 38–39 (citing Second Circuit cases addressing permitting warrantless searches in
vulnerable transportation hubs).
180. Id. at 40.
181. See Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014).

2017

CYBERSURVEILLANCE NONINTRUSION TEST

1857

an arrestee’s person is fair game at the time of arrest.182 Importantly,
however, there were no arguments about national security implications
and the government’s interest in pursuing and stopping criminal activity
was not enough to carry the day.183
As noted above, the question of whether an activity constitutes a search,
the issue in Katz, is distinct from the follow-up question of whether a
search remains reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes, even in the
absence of a warrant.184 The Court has permitted warrantless searches in
a number of circumstances, including the “search incident to arrest”
doctrine discussed in Riley.185 In Riley, the Court heard two consolidated
cases that presented the same issue: whether police officers arresting an
individual are entitled to search the contents of a suspect’s cell phone for
incriminating evidence.186 The officers in both cases relied upon the
“search incident to arrest doctrine,” which the Court’s precedent
established as bright line categorical rule allowing a search of a suspect’s
person at the time of arrest.187 Thus, as the Court explained in Riley, while
a search of a suspect’s house was not authorized, the search of “personal
property . . . immediately associated with the person of the arrestee” is
permissible.188 Even if such a warrantless search may be perceived under
some circumstances as unreasonable, this concern is overcome by the
need to ensure the safety of the arresting officer and the need to preserve
evidence on a suspect’s person that might be destroyed or concealed.189
In explaining that the doctrine provides a bright line rule and that
officers are entitled to examine what is on the suspect’s person at the time
of the arrest, even if there is no plausible argument that their safety
requires such an examination or that material evidence might otherwise
be destroyed, the Court was setting forth why the government should have
won the case—just as it should have won the case in Katz and just as it
should have won in Klayman and Clapper by virtue of Katz. Indeed, the

182. Id. at 2485 (“We therefore decline to extend Robinson to searches of data on cell phones, and
hold instead that officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting such a search.”).
183. Id.
184. See supra section I.A.
185. Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 at 2477–79.
186. Id. at 2482.
187. Id. at 2483.
188. Id. at 2484 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977)).
189. Id. at 2483 (articulating the concerns as to whether these types of warrantless searches may be
perceived as unreasonable); id. at 2484 (citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15).
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Court went so far as to say “a mechanical application of [the relevant
precedent] might well support the warrantless searches at issue here.”190
The Court’s reasoning followed the familiar contours of cases
refashioning settled doctrine. The Court explained that the cell phone is
“based on technology nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago” when
it established its governing “search incident to arrest” precedent.191 Cell
phones, while a physical object on the person, are different because of the
amounts of data they contain. Quantitative difference, again, becomes a
qualitative difference.192 The quantity of information available on a phone
is incomparable to what a person could physically carry were that
information not in the form of data and, as such, searches of such data
“implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of
a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”193 In his concurrence, Justice Alito
pointed out the oddity that personal information in the form of letters,
messages, and photos, when carried physically on the person are fair game
but storing them electronically on the phone shields them from the
arresting officer’s search.194 Essentially, the Court’s holding appeared to
accord greater protection to electronic data than tangible objects.
Nevertheless, Justice Alito supported the Court’s holding for lack of a
“workable alternative” that provides clear guidance to the police in a
world where “the nature of the electronic devices that ordinary Americans
carry on their persons would continue to change.”195
The Court was motivated by more than just the quantity of information
accessible on a cell phone. It recognized that the cell phone is integral to
modern society, noting they are ubiquitous and that “more than 90% of
American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital
record of nearly every aspect of their lives.”196 Although Orwellian
rhetoric does not find its way into Riley, the Court nevertheless considers
the implications of “[a]llowing the police to scrutinize such records on a
routine basis” and rejects it.197

190. Id. at 2484.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2489 (noting that a phone can store “millions of pages of text” and that “[w]e expect that
the gulf between physical practicability and digital capacity will only continue to widen in the
future”).
193. Id. at 2488–89.
194. Id. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court’s broad holding favors information in digital
form over information in hard-copy form.”).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2490 (majority opinion).
197. Id.
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A significant observation from Riley is that the informational data on
the cell phone is likely unprotected from a search under Katz because by
storing such data on a cell phone, the data has been disclosed to third
parties (the service providers) and, thus, there is arguably no longer any
reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court notes, as a reason for
protecting such data in the context of the search incident to arrest doctrine,
that data on cell phones is stored on a network and accessed through
remote servers.198 The Court notes this by way of suggesting that such
data is arguably not even physically present on the person of an arrestee,
but the same observation could be mustered to defeat an argument that the
arrestee ever had an expectation of privacy concerning such networked
data.
The government suggested that an officer should at least be able to
search the phone log, relying on precedent holding that use of a pen
register did not offend the Fourth Amendment because the information
gathered, having already been disclosed to a third party, was not subject
to an expectation of privacy.199 The Court rejected that argument because
the question in the relevant case, Smith v. Maryland, was whether a search
had even occurred, while in Riley, the government conceded that a search
had occurred—the issue was whether a cell phone may be searched
without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest.200 Consequently, if
examining publicly disclosed data does not constitute a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, there can be no question whether the
non-search was unreasonable absent a warrant.
Riley has answered the question of whether examining cellphone or
smartphone data is a search in the first place.201 There is an objective
social expectation that police cannot routinely rifle through cellphone or
smartphone data at the time of arrest without a warrant.202 This, in turn,
likely makes any subjective expectation of privacy for such data
reasonable, regardless of how many other entities have access to or store
such “private” personal information. The Court recognized the
government’s countervailing interest in accessing such information for
law enforcement purposes.203 The Court rejected arguments about
protecting officer safety—that a cell phone search could alert officer’s to
198. Id. at 2491.
199. Id. at 2492.
200. Id. at 2482 (“The two cases before us concern the reasonableness of a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest.”).
201. Id. at 2484.
202. Id. at 2492.
203. Id.
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approaching criminal accomplices—because there was no “evidence to
suggest that their concerns are based on actual experience.”204 The Court
similarly rejected concerns about destruction of evidence—remote wiping
of cell phones—because the Court had “been given little reason to believe
that either problem is prevalent.”205 By requiring evidence of the claimed
problem of remote deletion of phone data, the Court applied a judicially
created test to determine when warrantless searches are reasonable.206
This evaded any uncertainty that the Court was stretching its competence
in evaluating whether the government needed warrantless access to cell
phones to address criminal enterprises.
Riley did not address national security, evading the complexity of
concerns that attempts to address international terrorism often adds. Even
so, Justice Alito’s concurrence echoed the Second Circuit’s request for
guidance in Clapper: “[l]egislatures [which], elected by the people, are in
a better position than we are to assess and respond to the changes that have
already occurred and those that almost certainly will take place in the
future.”207 Whether Riley would come out the same way if the case had
involved national security or a terrorist bomb threat is unclear. The Court
noted that the exigent circumstances exception provides recourse for law
enforcement in the face of “the more extreme hypotheticals that have been
suggested.”208 Riley appears to be a clear statement that the Court believes
the Fourth Amendment shields personal data from a warrantless search,
even if it does not squarely address whether collecting such data even
comes within the ambit of a search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. But its holding will not be fully tested (and potentially
narrowed) until Riley is invoked as precedent in the context of a case
implicating national security concerns.
II.

CONTOURS OF THE 1984 CYBERSURVEILLANCE
PROBLEM

What role, if any, will the Fourth Amendment play in restraining
rapidly evolving data surveillance, or dataveillance, technologies, and
cybersurveillance programs that now constitute what some scholars have
described as the post-9/11 “National Surveillance State?”209 The Fourth
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 2485.
Id. at 2486.
Id. at 2478.
Id. at 2497–98 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2494 (majority opinion).
See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1

2017

CYBERSURVEILLANCE NONINTRUSION TEST

1861

Amendment protects ordinary citizens from mass surveillance and
suspicionless surveillance fishing expeditions.210 Increasingly, therefore,
ordinary citizens and other private parties are seeking Fourth Amendment
protection from the expanding encroachment and intrusiveness of
bureaucratized cybersurveillance and big data cybersurveillance.211 These
technologies execute surveillance through digital data, and big data- and
database-driven methodologies that are increasingly comprehensive in
scope.212
References to dystopian literature emerge to contextualize judicial
results and evoke police state or totalitarian implications in federal court
decisions. In effect, dystopian references mark the limits of current legal
doctrines when confronted by the fast-changing social realities of a
technologically driven economy and society. The invocation of dystopian
narrative provides an extra-legal framework to explain why a potential
legal result is intolerable even when, in a strictly legal framework, the
result is not problematic at all. This invocation signals a critical need in
the law: taking the pulse of the Constitution and related legal doctrines to
ensure democratic vitality.213 Thomas Crocker argues that dystopian
(2008); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan
Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006).
210. See, e.g., Gray, A Collective Right, supra note 41, at 191 (arguing that “contemporary tracking
technologies threaten the collective security of the people from unreasonable searches”); Tracey
Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
9 (1994); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1107 (2002) (“[B]y obtaining private sector records, the government can
conduct the type of ‘fishing expeditions’ that the Framers feared.”) (citing LEONARD W. LEVY,
ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 158 (1999)).
211. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (presenting prima facie
challenges to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act of 2008, which empowers the
FISC court to authorize surveillance without a showing of probable cause that the target of
surveillance is an agent of a foreign power).
212. Biometric databases, particularly DNA databases, are increasingly relied upon for a variety of
criminal law purposes, including “DNA trawling” or “DNA fishing” for prosecution and conviction,
as well as using DNA databases for genetic profiling to assess any predictive or diagnostic value. See,
e.g., David H. Kaye, Please, Let’s Bury the Junk: The CODIS Loci and the Revelation of Private
Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70, 71–81 (2007) (analyzing the medical and biological
implications of DNA records in the National DNA Index System, and its local and state components);
David H. Kaye, Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: A Legal and Logical Analysis of DNA Trawling
Cases, 87 N.C. L. REV. 425, 425 (2009) (discussing how prosecutors may identify defendants by
“fishing through a database of DNA types to find a match”); Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers?
Deciding When DNA Alone Is Enough To Convict, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130, 1131–85 (2010) (arguing
that the numerical nature of pure cold hit evidence requires courts and deciders of fact to consider
more carefully the sufficiency of the DNA method).
213. See, e.g., Crocker, Dystopian Constitutionalism, supra note 28, at 595 (suggesting that a
dystopian analysis provides a method through which constitutional values are articulated and applied
in contrast to values and practices the American polity agrees it wishes to avoid).
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constitutional analysis “provides a method through which constitutional
values are articulated and applied in contrast to values and practices the
American polity agrees it wishes to avoid.”214 Such rhetorical outbursts
have no legal value in the sense that they are, of course, no more than just
rhetoric.215 But they are valuable in this context as a marker for the limits
and gaps of our traditional legal discourse.
References to George Orwell’s 1984 conjure up specific and widely
recognized images of a police state,216
214. Id.
215. Courts are often resistant to parties raising these arguments. See, e.g., Camara v. Gonzales,
166 Fed. App’x 840, 844 (6th Cir. 2006) (“This Court, however, does not have the authority to
overturn federal regulations based on policy arguments, nor do the writings of George Orwell or any
other fiction writer provide this Court with any legal authority.”). Courts do, however, regularly refer
to Orwell independently. See infra notes 216–21.
216. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 466–67 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing
the dangers of unchecked law enforcement); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 409 (3d Cir.
2011) (explaining how DNA testing may empower the government to conduct DNA “dragnets”);
United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 14–15 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing potential governmental abuses
of stored DNA information); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[G]enetic
fingerprints differ somewhat from their metacarpal brethren, and future technological advances in
DNA testing (coupled with possible expansions of the DNA Act’s scope) may empower the
government to conduct wide-ranging ‘DNA dragnets’ that raise justifiable citations to George
Orwell.”); United States v. 15324 Cty. Highway E, Richland Ctr., 219 F.3d 602, 603 (7th Cir. 2000)
(referencing the possibility of an Orwellian-type dystopia resulting from government abuse of
surveillance technology), vacated sub nom. Acker v. United States, 533 U.S. 913 (2001); Cramer v.
Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 209 F.3d 1122, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2000) (Fisher, J., dissenting in part)
(making reference to Orwell and mass surveillance); United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th
Cir. 1999) (Noonan, J., dissenting), rev’d, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (describing the unappealing nature of
an Orwellian surveillance state); United States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 619 (5th Cir. 1993) (Parker,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that no “chinese wall” allowing team prosecutors
access to the ill-gotten gains because it would be an unacceptable risk of sanctioning Orwellian
investigative techniques and creating a Kafka-like judicial administration); United States v. CuevasSanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251, nn.4–5 (5th Cir. 1987) (describing how indiscriminate video surveillance
raises the spectre of the Orwellian state); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 1984)
(describing how certain surveillance techniques are “reminiscent of the ‘telescreens’ by which ‘Big
Brother’ in George Orwell’s 1984 maintained visual surveillance of the entire population”); id. at 887
(Cudahy, J., concurring); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876, 882 (9th Cir. 1980) (explaining how a
reversal of the suppression order at issue “would lead to systematic government programs to
‘persuade’ young children to inform against their parents, as in the societies created by George Orwell
and Adolf Hitler”); United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837, 841–42 (6th Cir. 1978) (“The novels of
Kafka and George Orwell evoke some of the same fears and concerns we feel when we contemplate
the possibility that wholesale eavesdropping and wiretapping by federal and local police could spread
and become customary.”), vacated, 441 U.S. 929 (1979); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 29,
33 (D.D.C. 2013) (arguing that future technological advances in DNA testing might enable the
government to carry out searches that raise justifiable references to George Orwell), vacated and
remanded, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015); United States v. McCotry, No. IP 06-CR-25-01-H/F, 2006
WL 2460757, at *16 (S.D. Ind. July 13, 2006) (discussing how courts have a “strong preference” for
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Hollingsworth, 495 F.3d
795 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Penn, 647 F.2d at 882); Hansen v. Turnage, No. C88-30261 RPA, 1988
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mass surveillance,217 torture,218 tyranny,219 and thought crime.220 1984
often serves as a placeholder to explain how the law has failed to preserve
individual autonomy, dignity, and rights in the face of changing social and
political circumstances.221 The moral force of 1984 can be attributed in
part to Orwell’s commitment to the democratic experiment.222 Scholars
have observed that the democratic principles embodied by the
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence animated Orwell’s
philosophical vision for his novel.223 Orwell concludes 1984 with an
excerpt of the Declaration of Independence,224 and as Akhil Amar, Jack
Balkin, and others have explained, the Declaration of Independence
animates and anchors the Constitution.225 As a heuristic for a surveillance
WL 147881, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 1988) (discussing privacy concerns implicated in police
searches); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D.N.J. 1986) (arguing that surveilling
an individual’s “off duty activities . . . is George Orwell’s ‘Big Brother’ Society come to life”);
Martinez v. Winner, 548 F. Supp. 278, 334 (D. Colo. 1982) (stating that “[n]o one wishes to live in a
society of the kind described in George Orwell’s 1984 or Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451, and no
federal court is going to be willing to grant its imprimatur to police intrusion into the security of an
activist’s person, house, papers and effects without strict adherence to Fourth Amendment
standards”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 771 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1985).
217. See, e.g., supra note 216 and infra notes 230–34 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 2006) (referencing Orwell in
describing plethysmograph testing); Conner v. Sticher, 801 F.2d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 1986) (Clark,
J., dissenting) (describing how state officials manipulated the plaintiffs’ perception of reality
comparable to the manipulation described in Orwell’s 1984).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 750 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The government
verges too close to tyranny when it sends its agents trolling through bars, tempts people to engage in
criminal conduct, and locks them up for unconscionable periods of time when they fall for the
scheme.”).
220. See, e.g., Weber, 451 F.3d at 554; id. at 570–71 (Noonan, J., concurring) (arguing that there
“is a line at which the government must stop” in surveillance).
221. See, e.g., id. at 570–71; United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999) (Noonan,
J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the majority regards the “Orwellian dangers as speculative
and at most potential”), rev’d, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Penn, 647 F.2d at 882 (“[A] reversal of the
suppression order here would lead to systematic government programs to ‘persuade’ young children
to inform against their parents, as in the societies created by George Orwell and Adolf Hitler.”); Brian
C. Murchison, Speech and the Truth-Seeking Value, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 55, 100 (2015) (“Perhaps
the cases do not involve acts of power as audacious or violent as that imagined by Orwell, but the
strong doctrines developed by courts display a wariness of power all the same, particularly its ability
to come between the individual and his ‘world.’”).
222. GEORGE ORWELL, WHY I WRITE 8 (Penguin 2005) (1946) (“Every line of serious work that I
have written since 1936 has been written, directly or indirectly, against totalitarianism and for
democratic Socialism, as I understand it.”).
223. See CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, WHY ORWELL MATTERS 103–14 (2003).
224. ORWELL, 1984, supra note 15, at 311−12.
225. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 253–55 (2012) (“The
Constitution’s enactment was widely understood as an implementation and extension of the
Declaration’s ringing language . . . .”); JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 23−24
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state and how democratic principles are betrayed, 1984 is easily adopted
by federal courts to characterize phenomena not yet adequately addressed
by legal tools.226 Specifically, through references to Orwell’s 1984 in the
context of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard in Fourth
Amendment cases, federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
increasingly express concern about mass surveillance as a social norm and
the potential of constitutionalizing that norm.227
Part II begins again with Jones, but then considers some earlier Court
decisions in which Justices signaled to 1984 to emphasize the problems
of surveillance. This Part illustrates how such rhetoric recurs at junctures
where the Fourth Amendment doctrine, although followed logically,
appears to fail to adequately address evolutions in government
surveillance. References to Orwell are, of course, pure rhetoric. Yet, this
rhetoric emerges in the gap between legal doctrine and surveillance
methods, and serves as a means for the Court to recognize the existence
of the gap—and the problems that it creates. Section B of Part II looks at
two dissenting opinions in earlier Court opinions—Justice Harlan’s
dissent in United States v. White,228 and Justice Brennan’s dissent in
Florida v. Riley229—and notes the recurrence of similar rhetoric in parallel
circumstances. In each of these cases, the Justices invoking such rhetoric
shifted the focus from an individual’s expectation of privacy to a broader
social expectation about the limits of government intrusion.

(2010) (contending that the Declaration of Independence anchors “[t]he ultimate goal of our
constitutional order . . . to produce not merely democratic procedures but a democratic culture”)
(emphasis in original).
226. See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 28, at 603–06 (describing the elements of dystopian analysis).
227. This argument appears to be consistent with Critical Legal Studies. Mark Tushnet explains
that it is possible to “abandon” constitutional rights if they are “defined on too abstract a level to be
helpful in resolving the claims presented in particular cases.” Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies:
An Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings, J. LEGAL EDUC. 505, 516 (1986) (“According to
the critique of rights, people cannot know what rights they have, and there are no political methods
that guarantee those rights. The term ‘Kafkaesque’ is perfectly appropriate and provides a clue to the
justification for the constructive program—or for the program of interminable critique. For by
invoking Kafka’s vision, the term allows CLS to say that it, like Kafka, is describing the condition of
the modern world.”).
228. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
229. 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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Orwell and the Fourth Amendment

It is unsurprising that 1984230 was invoked by the Supreme Court
during oral argument in United States v. Jones231 in response to the
government’s contention that twenty-four-hour locational surveillance
does not present a Fourth Amendment problem.232 Additionally, in the
post-Snowden litigation concerning the constitutionality of the NSA’s
bulk telephony data program, Judge Leon also invoked images of 1984,
characterizing the NSA’s mass collection of U.S. telephone data as
“almost Orwellian,” before rejecting a mechanical application of current
precedent to ratify the program.233 Judge Leon explained, “I cannot
imagine a more ‘indiscriminate’ and ‘arbitrary invasion’ than this
systematic and high-tech collection and retention of personal data on
virtually every single citizen for purposes of querying and analyzing it
without prior judicial approval.”234
Yet, while Jones marked one of the most recent collisions between
cybersurveillance technology and the limits of traditional Fourth
Amendment doctrine,235 the Supreme Court has yet to come to grips with
the full implications of the modern cybersurveillance world that Judge
Leon conjured in Klayman v. Obama.236 In Jones, the Supreme Court
230. ORWELL, 1984, supra note 15.
231. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
232. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16 at 13, 25, 27, 33, 35, 57.
233. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 32–33 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded, 800
F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
234. Id. at 42.
235. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476 (2011); see also supra note 45 (discussing the Court’s grant of certiorari in Carpenter v.
United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016)).
236. 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why
Property Does Not Define the Limits of the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102
MICH. L. REV. 889, 890 (2004) (contending that while existing Fourth Amendment doctrine nominally
protects normatively and empirically reasonable expectations of privacy, in practice the doctrine
protects only but not privacy); William Funk, Electronic Surveillance of Terrorism in the United
States, 80 MISS. L.J. 1491, 1492 (2011) (describing how combating international terrorism, or the war
on terror, has confused the historical distinction between intelligence gathering and law enforcement);
Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55
UCLA L. REV. 409, 410–65 (2007) (outlining an analytical framework for Fourth Amendment issues
that can be applied more broadly to future technological enhancements). Some scholars focus on
statutory frameworks for governing surveillance technologies and for structuring domestic and
foreign intelligence surveillance law. They recommend the enactment of congressional legislation,
rather than reliance upon the Fourth Amendment, as the best prescription to any potential harms
emanating from modern cybersurveillance. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 806 (2004)
(contending that the legislative branch rather than the judiciary should create the primary investigative
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considered the constitutionality of the warrantless 24/7 tracking of a
criminal suspect through a GPS-tracking device attached to a vehicle.237
Law enforcement agents attached a GPS device to Antoine Jones’s Jeep
while it was located in a public parking lot in Maryland.238 The device
remained on Jones’s vehicle for the next four weeks undetected.239 During
that time, at ten-second intervals, the device calculated and transmitted
the vehicle’s precise location to law enforcement computers that recorded
and stored the data transmitted.240 Ultimately, this GPS tracking enabled
the government to discover the whereabouts of a stash house containing
large amounts of narcotics.241
The Court decided the case on narrow grounds and temporarily avoided
larger and lingering questions regarding what expectations of privacy are
reasonable within the realm of cybersurveillance.242 Nor does Jones
rules when technology is advancing); Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot
Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 609–73 (2003) (describing how
misconceptions about both the law and technology of the Internet has led to significant
misunderstandings about Internet surveillance law and the effect of the USA Patriot Act); Peter P.
Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1308
(2004) (explaining that the Supreme Court drew distinctions between domestic and “foreign
intelligence” surveillance and what procedures were required under the Fourth Amendment)
(“Supporters of surveillance could gain by a statutory system that expressly authorized foreign
intelligence wiretaps, lending the weight of congressional approval to surveillance that did not meet
all the requirements of ordinary Fourth Amendment searches. Critics of surveillance could
institutionalize a series of checks and balances on the previously unfettered discretion of the President
and the Attorney General to conduct surveillance in the name of national security.”).
237. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).
238. Id. The government had applied for, and received a warrant to install the device on the Jeep.
Id. The warrant authorized installing the device within ten days in the District of Columbia. Id. at
402–03. The government installed the device eleven days later in Maryland. Id.
239. Id. at 403.
240. Id.; Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 50.
241. Jones, 565 U.S. at 402–04.
242. See id. at 411–13. The appropriate role of cybersurveillance in governance and promulgating
security goals, as well as database privacy rights, are topics that have also formed the basis of rich
academic discourse in recent years. See, e.g., ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD, supra note 4, at 29–30
(discussing the disconnect between invasive governmental policies and the purpose they were
designed to serve and stating that “there is a grave danger . . . that our emotional response to the new
fears that menace us will lead us to adopt ineffective and unnecessarily invasive architectures of
identification and risk profiling that could linger long after the fears that inspired them have passed”);
Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1265–
305 (2004) (recommending that warrants supported by probable cause should be required for the
majority of uses of electronic surveillance); James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance,
Sovereignty and Hard-Wired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997) (explaining how the conceptual
structure of digital libertarianism lead its practitioners to ignore ways in which the government can
use privatized enforcement and state-backed technologies to evade restraints on the exercise of legal
power over the internet); Wittes, Databuse: Digital Privacy and the Mosaic, supra note 108, at 18
(describing the ideal balance between security and privacy rights).
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articulate a limiting principle to restrain government intrusiveness with
regard to comprehensive dataveillance and cybersurveillance.243 As
Justice Alito commented in his concurrence in Jones, when confronted
with a “21st-century surveillance technique,” the Court resorted to “18thcentury tort law.”244 Yet, as the dramatic cybersurveillance disclosures
provided by Snowden demonstrate, the GPS device considered in Jones
is already antiquated by twenty-first century standards.245
As President Obama explained in an interview after the Snowden
disclosures: “[i]n some ways, the technology and the budgets and the
capacity [at NSA] have outstripped the constraints. And we’ve got to
rebuild those [constraints] in the same way that we’re having to do on a
whole series of capacities . . . [such as] drone operations.”246 Federal
courts, including the Supreme Court, are necessarily engaged in an
attempt to develop those constraints in their effort to keep the Fourth
Amendment relevant. Their recognition of the limits of current doctrine is
evidenced by a recurrence of dystopian 1984-styled rhetoric when
confronted with modern governmental surveillance technologies. A
central principle underpinning 1984, and one that was not lost on several
of the Supreme Court Justices during oral argument in Jones, is the notion
243. Multiple scholars have explored in depth the constitutional implications of technological
advances in surveillance and the incorporation of such technologies in national security policy. See,
e.g., SIMON CHESTERMAN, ONE NATION UNDER SURVEILLANCE: A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT TO
DEFEND FREEDOM WITHOUT SACRIFICING LIBERTY 6 (2011) (providing a new means to understand
intelligence “in its modern context”); DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY
AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 101 (2007) (“[T]here are deep-rooted reasons why
government officials are unlikely to balance security and the rule of law fairly or accurately in times
of crisis.”); DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (1999) (arguing that the war on terror can be
fought without secret searches and guilt by association); Slobogin, supra note 31, at 11–46 (describing
legal challenges associated with virtual surveillance as crime prevention and counterterrorism tools);
JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT (2008) (considering the role of the right to privacy in the
modern day’s intrusive world); Kerr, Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory, supra note 235, at 479
(describing how judicial decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment are infamous for their
“byzantine patchwork of protections”); Jonathan Zittrain, Comment, Searches and Seizures in a
Networked World, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 83, 84 (2005) (arguing that any retrieval of information
stored on a computer hard drive should be considered a distinct Fourth Amendment search). See, e.g.,
Hutchins, supra note 236, at 413 (arguing that existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can
effectively rein in the use of emerging GPS technology).
244. Jones, 565 U.S. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring).
245. See GREENWALD, supra note 1; Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions
of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013
/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order [https://perma.cc/YM93-7869].
246. Ellen Nakashima, NSA Morale Down After Edward Snowden Revelations, Former U.S.
Officials Say, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security
/nsa-morale-down-after-edward-snowden-revelations-former-us-officials-say/2013/12/07/24975
c14-5c65-11e3-95c2-13623eb2b0e1_story.html [https://perma.cc/UE8Y-VNK2].

1868

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1819

that individual autonomy must be preserved to maintain a functional
democratic society.247 This principle has been deployed in the court of
public opinion to illuminate a growing concern over various newly
emerging cybersurveillance and dataveillance programs.248
During oral argument of Jones, the references to 1984 suggested that
the Court was deeply disturbed by the implications of a ruling ratifying
potentially untrammeled surveillance.249 The oral argument expressed a
need to avoid “an omen of 1984,”250 “a 1984-type invasion”251 of privacy,
“the so-called 1984 scenarios,”252 and the “1984 [M]inistry of [L]ove,
[M]inistry of—of [P]eace problem.”253 In Jones, 1984 served as a cultural
touchstone establishing the boundaries of socially acceptable monitoring
of citizens even if such monitoring did not violate any reasonable
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment’s Katz test.
In Jones, the Court considered whether government GPS-enabled
surveillance of an individual’s every movement, every minute of every
day for as long as the government may wish, raises a Fourth Amendment
problem.254 On the one hand, it is settled law that there are typically little
or no Fourth Amendment protections for our movements in public places
because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in places where
other people can naturally observe us.255 In a small data world, the Court
has previously drawn a line between what is public and private.256 Vehicle
movements along public roads cannot be considered private and,
therefore, are not constitutionally protected from government
surveillance.257 Thus, a lot more of nothing—in the form of allencompassing tracking of your movement in public spaces through GPS

247. ORWELL, 1984, supra note 15.
248. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Court Asks If ‘Big Brother’ Is Spelled GPS, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/us/11gps.html
[https://perma.cc/9TJ4-PV9T]
(discussing the Court’s potential decision on the constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking in
advance of oral argument in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)).
249. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 13, 25–26, 33, 35, 57.
250. Id. at 27.
251. Id. at 57.
252. Id. at 25.
253. Id. at 35.
254. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–03 (2012).
255. See, e.g., Hutchins, supra note 236, at 413 (arguing that existing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence can effectively be read to rein in the use of GPS as one emerging tracking technology).
256. See, e.g., United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 359–61 (discussing the test for privacy
expectations).
257. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 (discussing the government’s contention that the location of
a vehicle—when visible to all—means there is no reasonable expectation of privacy).
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surveillance—is still nothing. Or, as Judge Sentelle of the D.C. Circuit
quipped, “[t]he sum of an infinite number of zero-value parts is also
zero.”258 According to Judge Sentelle’s logic, if under the law, (A) we lack
any reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to our public comings
and goings; therefore, it follows that (B) we lack any reasonable
expectation of privacy in the government’s accumulation of data tracking
our every movement in a public space every day for as many days, or
months, or years, as the government wishes, without our knowledge or
consent.259 In other words, quantitative differences cannot become
qualitative differences under the relevant legal test.
And yet, to say that unlimited and comprehensive surveillance of the
kind facilitated by 24/7 GPS tracking is not legally cognizable as a Fourth
Amendment problem struck several of the Justices as troubling. Both
specific Justices and counsel during oral argument invoked 1984 to serve
as a benchmark against which to measure what they considered to have
been the intuitively unreasonable result sought by the government’s
argument, regardless of how legally sound, because of its potentially antidemocratic implications.260
The government countered that sophisticated tracking techniques, such
as the use of remote GPS monitoring technologies, proved even more
reasonable than other accepted surveillance methods. Specifically, the
government contended that because remote data-driven surveillance does
not offend the expectation of freedom from physical or sensory-based
intrusion,261 one of the traditional bulwarks of Fourth Amendment
protection, it must be reasonable. The government’s rationale suggests a
gradual diminishment of Fourth Amendment protections. As individuals
become accustomed to continuous location tracking, and such data is
accumulated and stored by the government and third parties, the
government’s argument becomes more persuasive. That is, there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy left to be violated by cybersurveillance
or dataveillance facilitated by common digital surveillance technologies
and government programs.

258. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc).
259. Id.
260. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 57–58; see also
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
261. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 8–9.
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Dystopian Narratives as Constitutional Touchstones

Some scholars have asserted “analogies to Orwell are just about always
useless.”262 Other scholars have contended that 1984 does not accurately
capture the types of issues and harms presented by modern
cybersurveillance technologies263 and present-day democratic societies.264
Nevertheless, as Orin Kerr has argued, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
has historically struggled to mediate between unacceptable extremes:
anarchy (where the police are rendered toothless) and dystopia (where
police dominate society).265 References to 1984 during oral argument in
Jones make clear which side of the spectrum the Court was concerned
with. This concern is not limited to GPS technology, but encompasses
new technologies that facilitate automated, automatic, and continuous
government surveillance on a widespread basis. This Orwellian tipping
point recurs in various court decisions addressed to GPS and
cybersurveillance technologies and it marks the gap between current
Fourth Amendment doctrine and what courts regard as socially intolerable
results from straightforward application of existing precedent.266

262. LESSIG, supra note 3, at 208. One critic explains that a natural aversion to Orwell may be the
result of over-used 1984 metaphors and an over-veneration of the author; Orwell “requires extricating
from a pile of saccharine tablets and moist hankies; [as] an object of sickly veneration and sentimental
over-praise.” HITCHENS, supra note 223, at 3.
263. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY
AND SECURITY 25–26 (2011) (asserting that Kafka provides a better metaphor than Orwell to
complement an understanding of the contemporary contours of surveillance); Ric Simmons, Why
2007 Is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on Technology’s Effect on Privacy and Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531, 531–36 (2007) (arguing that
technologies have enhanced privacy and that surveillance technologies engaged by law enforcement
represent a response to enhanced levels of privacy enabled by newly introduced technologies); Kerr,
Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act, supra note 236, at 673 (contending that the
PATRIOT Act did not result in Orwellian expansion of Internet surveillance powers by government,
explaining that “a focus on the details of the legislation suggests that the Act that has been portrayed
as the road to Big Brother does not actually head there”).
264. See Michael Moynihan, Sorry, We’re Not Living in Orwell’s ‘1984’, NEWSWEEK (June 19,
2013), http://mag.newsweek.com/2013/06/19/sorry-we-re-not-living-in-orwell-s-1984.html [https://
perma.cc/TXT6-JZHD].
265. Kerr, Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory, supra note 235, at 488; see also id. at 499–501.
266. Past scholarship has noted a connection between Orwell and the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Arcila, Jr., supra note 108, at 3 (observing that the Supreme Court compared law enforcement’s
aggressive use of GPS tracking to dystopia and George Orwell’s 1984); Crocker, supra note 28, at
595–632 (highlighting numerous judicial references to Orwell’s dystopian future and the modern
surveillance state); Timothy C. MacDonnell, Orwellian Ramifications: The Contraband Exception to
the Fourth Amendment, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 299, 301 (2010) (contending that despite Orwell’s fearful
vision and the government’s technological ability to intrude on privacy, the Fourth Amendment on
its face seems to prohibit such surveillance).
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As one scholar has explained, 1984 “depict[s] the completely
bureaucratized society, in which man is a number and loses all sense of
individuality.”267 This is presented as an uncomfortable parallel to current
bureaucratized measures whereby individuals such as Mr. Jones—or, as
the government conceded, even the Justices themselves268—could be
subject to the search and seizure of identity, and dissected by their
geolocational data. With the advent of big data cybersurveillance
technologies, some experts note that protecting privacy as a legal doctrine,
such as through a defense of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
test, can no longer be the primary concern.269 Given the
comprehensiveness of ubiquitous mass cybersurveillance technologies,
the predominant concern now is how to protect the “sanctity of the
individual.”270 With the search and seizure of identity, the key harm is
metaphysical and philosophical: the steady erosion of autonomy and selfdetermination, and the slow backslide away from a commitment to a
vision of inalienable rights that comes with such identity-centered
searches and seizures.
Since Katz, the Court has frequently confronted how best to preserve a
reasonable expectation of privacy in light of an increasing adoption of
unreasonable surveillance technologies and modern surveillance
practices. In United States v. White271 and Florida v. Riley,272 two cases
nearly twenty years apart, dissenting Justices highlighted their concern
about where the burden of protecting individual expectations of privacy
lay. In both opinions, the dissenters pointed out the harm done to Fourth
Amendment values—with potentially disastrous (or even dystopian)
consequences—by constitutionalizing surveillance as a norm.

267. Erich Fromm, Afterword, in ORWELL, supra note 15.
268. See Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 9–10.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You think there would also not be a search if you put a GPS device
on all of our cars, monitored our movements for a month? You think you’re entitled to do that
under your theory?
MR. DREEBEN: The Justices of this Court?
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes. (Laughter.)
MR. DREBEEN: Under our theory and under this Court’s cases, the Justices of this Court when
driving on public roadways have no greater expectation of—
Id.
269. See Chemerinsky, supra note 11 (arguing that the current jurisprudence on the Fourth
Amendment should be altered to accommodate changing technology and forms of information that
can be seized).
270. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 13, at 17.
271. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
272. 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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In United States v. White, White appealed from a 1966 federal narcotics
conviction arguing that the use of a radio transmitter without a warrant by
a government informant violated his Fourth Amendment rights.273 The
informant carried the transmitter on his person. Some of the conversations
between White and the informant took place in the informant’s home, with
an agent listening to the conversations from the informant’s kitchen
closet. Other conversations took place elsewhere, including White’s
home, and government agents listened to the conversations with radio
equipment.274 The Seventh Circuit reversed White’s conviction,
concluding that Katz prohibited the agents’ testimony.275 The Supreme
Court concluded that the Seventh Circuit erred by “misinterpret[ing] both
the Katz case and the Fourth Amendment and in any event erred in allying
the Katz case to events that occurred before that decision was rendered by
this Court.”276 Relying on prior precedent involving informant and
undercover agent conversations,277 the Court concluded that “[i]f the law
gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or
becomes a police agent, neither should it protect him when that same agent
has recorded or transmitted the conversations which are later offered in
evidence to prove the State’s case.”278 Under the Katz framework, this
expectation of privacy fails because society would not ratify such an
expectation of privacy.
Justice Harlan dissented in a notable and oft-cited opinion in which he
discussed his concerns surrounding unchecked law enforcement use of
technology. He explained that, while technology can be used for enforcing
criminal laws, given “the stream of current developments in Fourth
Amendment law . . . it must be held that third-party electronic monitoring,
subject only to the self-restraint of law enforcement officials, has no place
in our society.”279 Justice Harlan did not intend to prohibit the use of
273. White, 401 U.S. at 746–47.
274. Id. at 747.
275. Id. (“The Court of Appeals read Katz v. United States as overruling On Lee v. United States,
and interpreting the Fourth Amendment to forbid the introduction of the agents’ testimony in the
circumstances of this case.” (citations omitted)).
276. Id.
277. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 314 (1966) (referencing the government’s use
of informers and undercover agents); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208–11 (1966) (discussing
the acceptable use of undercover agents to garner evidence); Lopez v. United States 373 U.S. 427,
451–52 (1963) (discussing the secret electronic transmission or recording of private communications
via undercover agent); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749–50 (1952) (evaluating the
admissibility of evidence collected by an undercover agent).
278. White, 401 U.S. at 752.
279. Id. at 790 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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“electronic eavesdropping,” rather, he believed that law enforcement
officers should obtain a warrant based on probable cause.280 Such a
requirement is, Justice Harlan explained, necessary to protect “the
expectation of the ordinary citizen” to engage in free private conversations
without worrying about whether his words will be used against him out of
context years later.281 Justice Harlan’s opinion suggests that the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment protects “a measure of privacy and
a sense of personal security throughout our society.”282
Electronic surveillance troubled Justice Harlan because of the
complexity of attempting to balance the issues in context of the Fourth
Amendment, and due to the “prevalence of police utilization” of “the
numerous devices that make technologically feasible the Orwellian Big
Brother.”283 For Justice Harlan, the fundamental principles of the Fourth
Amendment protect core democratic values and traditions by “plac[ing]
limitations on the means and circumstances by which the government may
collect information about its citizens by intruding into their personal
lives.”284 These principles, as well as the capabilities of modern
technology, led Justice Harlan to conclude that electronic surveillance by
law enforcement requires a different analysis: “the burden of guarding
privacy in a free society should not be on its citizens; it is the government
that must justify its need to electronically eavesdrop.”285 Nearly twenty
years later, Justice Brennan raised many of these arguments in a dissent
that dealt not with increased surveillance capacities due to technology, but
with invasive law enforcement surveillance practices.286
In Florida v. Riley, a plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that an
individual lacked an expectation of privacy in the contents of his
greenhouse that were visible from a police helicopter hovering at 400
feet.287 Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the plurality opinion “reads
almost as if Katz v. United States had never been decided.”288 Justice

280. Id. (“It would prevent public officials from engaging in that practice unless they first had
probable cause to suspect an individual of involvement in illegal activities and had tested their version
of the facts before a detached judicial officer.”).
281. Id.
282. Id.; see also David Gray, Fourth Amendment Remedies as Rights: The Warrant Requirement,
96 B.U. L. REV. 425, 479 (2016).
283. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 770 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 792.
285. Id. at 793.
286. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 456–68 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 451–52 (plurality opinion).
288. Id. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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Brennan argued that the plurality misapplied Katz’s focus on whether
officers violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as an
individual’s expectation of privacy in his curtilage, rather than whether
officers had a legal right to be where they were when they engaged in
surveillance.289 The better inquiry under this case, Justice Brennan
explained, was whether such surveillance “is consistent with the ‘aims of
a free and open society.’”290 He rejected the plurality’s suggestion that
such surveillance might be a Fourth Amendment problem because of
interference with the occupant’s normal use as irrelevant to the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.291 Fundamental principles behind the Fourth
Amendment such as personal privacy, security, dignity, and protection
from arbitrary government invasions arguably mandated a different result
in Florida v. Riley, at least according to Justice Brennan.292
The real problem, Justice Brennan pointed out, is not whether intimate
activities could be observed,293 but whether there was any limiting
principle behind aerial surveillance that could observe any citizen at any
time.294 Citing both Justice Harlan’s dissent in White, and Anthony
Amsterdam’s Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, Justice Brennan
concluded that Florida v. Riley seemed to switch the burden of protecting
privacy to the citizen, rather than requiring the government to justify its
decisions.295 Justice Brennan ended his opinion with a sobering reminder
of the potential for constitutionalizing dystopian norms through decisions
that, though consistent with precedent, ultimately undermine fundamental
values behind the Fourth Amendment. He pointed out that “the police
surveillance methods [the plurality] would sanction were among those
289. Id.
290. Id. at 457 (quoting Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 349, 403 (1974)).
291. Id. at 461–62 (“If through noise, wind, dust, and threat of injury from helicopters the State
‘interfered with respondent’s normal use of the greenhouse or of other parts of the curtilage,’ Riley
might have a cause of action in inverse condemnation, but that is not what the Fourth Amendment is
all about.”).
292. Id.
293. Id. at 463 (“Where in the Fourth Amendment or in our cases is there any warrant for imposing
a requirement that the activity observed must be ‘intimate’ in order to be protected by the
Constitution?”).
294. Id. at 464 (“If the Constitution does not protect Riley’s marijuana garden against such
surveillance, it is hard to see how it will prohibit the government from aerial spying on the activities
of a law-abiding citizen on her fully enclosed outdoor patio.”).
295. Id. (“As Professor Amsterdam has eloquently written: ‘The question is not whether you or I
must draw the blinds before we commit a crime. It is whether you and I must discipline ourselves to
draw the blinds every time we enter a room, under pain of surveillance if we do not.’” (quoting
Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 403 (1974))).
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described 40 years ago in George Orwell’s dreadful vision of life in the
1980s.”296 Quoting from a passage in 1984 that described helicopter
surveillance into people’s windows, Justice Brennan concluded: “Who
can read this passage without a shudder, and without the instinctive
reaction that it depicts life in some country other than ours?”297
Both Justices Brennan and Harlan reached for 1984 to contextualize
and explore the complexities and dangers of unchecked law enforcement
intrusions into citizens’ lives. Those intrusions, while apparently
constitutional—which is to say consistent with existing law and precedent
interpreting the Fourth Amendment—nevertheless raised concerns about
the erosion of core constitutional principles underlying the Fourth
Amendment absent revision of court doctrine. Both the majority in White
and the plurality in Florida v. Riley place the burden of restraining
government intrusion on the citizen who must demonstrate a reasonable
expectation of privacy as the basis to restrain the government.298 Yet,
Justice Brennan and Justice Harlan, uncomfortable with the result of that
judicial inquiry, urge that the Fourth Amendment should place the burden
on the government to justify the kind of intrusion the Court is asked to
endorse as consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Brennan and Justice Harlan used Orwellian references to
highlight the danger of constitutionalizing unconstitutional norms through
rote application of existing precedent—a strategy that the Supreme Court
justices used in the Jones oral argument. In each case, resort to rhetoric
implicitly conceded that there is simply inadequate legal vocabulary or
doctrinal principles yet developed to help the Court address the potential
indiscriminate mass surveillance consequences that can be facilitated by
new surveillance technologies.
III. CUSTOMARY LAW AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Judicial appeals to Congress to provide guidance in how Fourth
Amendment doctrines should evolve acknowledge the Legislative
branch’s fact-finding authority. And, in congressional testimony,
Congress has previously heard that an evaluation of the Fourth
Amendment requires an assessment of cultural values and societal

296. Id. at 466.
297. Id. at 467.
298. The Court did not actually apply the Katz test to the circumstances in United States v. White
because the events in the case occurred before the Court had decided Katz. See United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 747 (1971). The Court concluded that the Seventh Circuit had erred by applying Katz.
Id.
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customs. In 1975, Congress convened intelligence oversight activities
under what is now referred to as the “Church Committee.”299 The
Committee was convened in response to media reports that claimed the
CIA had been engaging in domestic operations against antiwar protestors
and other individuals during the Nixon Administration.300 It had a broad
mission: to investigate “governmental operations with respect to
intelligence activities and of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper,
or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal
Government . . . . ”301 The hearings and reports of the “Church
Committee” fell within the jurisdiction of the Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
under the chairmanship of Senator Frank Church. The House Select
Committee on Intelligence under the chairmanship of Representative Otis
Pike conducted parallel hearings.302
Pursuant to the Church Committee proceedings, Congress held
hearings focused on how federal wiretapping surveillance implicated the
Fourth Amendment and staged a general investigation of the issue in a
way that cannot typically occur in a courtroom. On October 29, 1975,
Attorney General Edward H. Levi testified before the U.S. Senate as part
of a series of congressional investigatory activities to “discuss the
relationship between electronic surveillance and the Fourth
Amendment.”303 Attorney General Levi explained:
Our understanding of the purposes underlying the [F]ourth
[A]mendment has been an evolving one. It has been shaped by
subsequent historical events, by the changing conditions of our
modern technological society, and by the development of our own
traditions, customs, and values. . . . [O]ur perceptions of the
language and spirit of the [A]mendment have gone beyond the
historical wrongs the [A]mendment was intended to prevent. The
Supreme Court has served as the primary explicator of these
evolving perceptions and has sought to articulate the values the
[A]mendment incorporates. 304
299. See S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. (1975) (establishing the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities).
300. See Christopher M. Ford, Intelligence Demands in a Democratic State: Congressional
Intelligence Oversight, 81 TUL. L. REV. 721, 739–40 (2007).
301. See S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. (1975) at 1.
302. See Ford, supra note 300, at 746.
303. The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights: Hearing before the Select
Comm. To Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong. 84
(1975) (written and oral statement of Edward H. Levi, Attorney General of the United States).
304. Id. at 93.
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The focus of the Fourth Amendment, therefore, involves keeping its literal
text relevant to the changing context in which it must apply: the evolving
“traditions, customs, and values”305 in which the Fourth Amendment must
remain relevant if a living Constitution is to persist.
Attorney General Levi explicitly pointed out the limitations of the Katz
privacy test. He explained that Katz in of itself does not provide a limiting
principle on “unlimited governmental intrusions[,]” and, therefore, cannot
of itself provide a vehicle to assess whether a government surveillance
program or practice “would pose too great a danger to the spontaneity of
human thought and behavior.”306 Quoting Justice Harlan’s dissent in
United States v. White, Levi observed that assessments of privacy “are in
large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and
values of the past and present.”307 Levi concluded that the proper
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment necessitates “[a] weighing of
values” and understanding the circumstances surrounding both privacy
expectations and “the need for an intrusion and its likely effect.”308 Levi’s
testimony was intended to inform statutory efforts to provide proper
oversight to the intelligence community in light of emerging electronic
surveillance capacities. The Church Committee’s efforts ultimately led to
the enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).309
The Church Committee and FISA are examples of the Legislative
branch intervening to protect judicially created Fourth Amendment
doctrine. As we have seen, there remains an active, ongoing debate on
whether or not Congress is in a better position than the federal courts to
determine the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment in light of changing
305. Id.
306. To be clear: the test emplaced by Katz cannot assess the intrusiveness of government
programs, but, as Levi noted, the emergence of the Katz test reflected a judicial assessment about the
intrusiveness of the government’s growing ability to monitor phone conversations. Id. at 75 (“Katz
turned ultimately on an assessment of the effect of permitting such unrestrained intrusions on the
individual in his private and social life. The judgement was that a license for unlimited governmental
intrusions upon every telephone would pose too great a danger to the spontaneity of human thought
and behavior.”).
307. Id. (quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The
analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations or legal attribution of
assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws
that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present.”)).
308. Id. (“A weighing of values is an inescapable part in the interpretation and growth of the Fourth
Amendment. Expectations, and their reasonableness, vary according to circumstances. So will the
need for an intrusion and its likely effect. These elements will define the boundaries of the interest
which the Amendment holds as ‘secure.’”).
309. See Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, supra note 2, at 766 (“Chaired by Senator Frank
Church, the Committee uncovered a range of disconcerting domestic surveillance operations—
including some conducted by the NSA—prompting Congress to pass the FISA.”).
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technology and national security needs.310 In his concurrence in Riley v.
California, Justice Alito pointed out that after Katz, Congress enacted a
statute that “authorizes but imposes detailed restrictions on electronic
surveillance[,]” rather than leaving the development of legal doctrine
around electronic surveillance to federal courts.311
Insofar as the query is whether a search is reasonable absent a
warrant—the question of Riley v. California—the issue involves
transposing the original intent of the Fourth Amendment into modern
circumstances such that the Amendment remains viable. In this sense, it
is logical to seek legislative guidance. Deciding what is reasonable
involves a broad social inquiry requiring courts to evaluate competing
interests of a citizenry to be free from untrammeled surveillance and the
government’s real need to meet threats of terrorism and criminal activity.
Justice Alito’s plea for legislative intervention, as well as other judicial
pleas, appear to be aimed toward obtaining guidance from the legislative
branch on the proper parameters of surveillance programs and practices.
Justice Alito explained in Riley v. California that “it would be very
unfortunate if privacy protection in the 21st century were left primarily to
the federal courts using the blunt instrument of the Fourth Amendment.
Legislatures, elected by the people, are in a better position than we are to
assess and respond” to rapidly changing technological developments and
social norms.312 Be that as it may, courts do not always have the luxury of
waiting for Congress to legislatively resolve what otherwise might pose a
Fourth Amendment problem. Courts must decide cases and controversies
as they reach them.
Where those cases and controversies involve the Fourth Amendment in
a collision with cybersurveillance, the judiciary must decide whether and
how the cultural norms of Fourth Amendment values are to be protected.
The second step of Katz—assessing a socially reasonable expectation of
privacy—requires a judicial response that examines Fourth Amendment
310. See, e.g., Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring)
(observing that new technologies are making it easier for the government to collect information about
the everyday lives of ordinary Americans); Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra
note 16, at 51–52 (discussing the privacy implications in light of contemporary technological
developments such as the potential for warrantless GPS tracking).
311. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The regulation of electronic
surveillance provides an instructive example. After this Court held [in Katz] that electronic
surveillance constitutes a search even when no property interest is invaded . . . Congress responded
by enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 211. . . .
Since that time, electronic surveillance has been governed primarily, not by decisions of this Court,
but by the statute, which authorizes but imposes detailed restrictions on electronic surveillance.”
(citations omitted)).
312. Id. at 2497–98.
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first principles. Yet, these principles require new doctrine to guide the
judiciary if it is to sustain the Fourth Amendment at all. Such norms—a
kind of constitutional customary law—start to reveal themselves at the
point where the “reasonable expectation” of Katz leads to patently
unreasonable results—an Orwellian tipping point that courts thus far
“know it when [they] see it,”313 even if they have not as yet been able to
comfortably articulate a new doctrine. Indeed, caution about articulating
such a new doctrine appears warranted given that, as courts repeatedly
note in decisions confronting big data-type surveillance, technology is
rapidly evolving. Given the current state of affairs, it may be best if, for
the time being, constitutional doctrine remains flexible, with an eye
toward making sure the results of decisions avoid blessing Orwellian
outcomes rather than focusing on adhering to a consistent and internally
logical doctrine that may lose its constitutional relevance on the eve of its
first formulation. Meanwhile, as courts are forced to achieve results in the
face of unsteady doctrine, those accumulating results may themselves start
to form the contours of a contemporary “customary law of privacy” from
which the dots can be connected to establish the tenets of a doctrine. It
appears that several Justices of the Court during Jones’s oral argument,
by invoking 1984, had “sought to articulate the values the Amendment
incorporates.”314 In short, the Court recognized that the Fourth
Amendment doctrine must now evolve to accommodate limitations on
government intrusiveness in light of increasingly comprehensive and
invasive cybersurveillance technologies.315
Currently, the Fourth Amendment is the site of multiple challenges to
the intrusiveness of cybersurveillance and dataveillance on private
lives.316 Of course, as the government conceded during the oral argument
in Jones, these cybersurveillance and dataveillance programs may also
implicate equality and First Amendment protections, among other
concepts.317 Other scholars have examined the implications of digitalized
decision making on due process rights, or “technological due process.”318
313. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (explaining a
case-by-case approach to judicial decision-making).
314. Prepared Statement of Edward H. Levi, supra note 303, at 93.
315. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(observing that technological advances that have made possible non-trespassory surveillance
techniques will further affect the Katz test by impacting the development of societal privacy
expectations).
316. See, e.g., supra notes 30, 50.
317. See Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 23.
318. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1301–13 (2008) (articulating a new model of technological due process as a means for an agency to
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But, for present purposes, the focus of this discussion remains on whether
and how the Fourth Amendment poses a restraint on government
cybersurveillance capacities.
This Part returns to Jones, with an initial focus on the legal precedents
and arguments the government invoked. The government focused on
Knotts, a case that the government persuasively suggested was directly on
point. This discussion is intended to clarify how normative, or customary,
the Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine already is. The government and
Court argued about normative expectations of privacy changing to
accommodate technological conveniences. Justice Alito’s concurrence
embraced much of this discussion, expressly noting the danger of the
“reasonable expectations of privacy” coming to embrace its unreasonable
diminution.319
A.

Privacy Customs and the Fourth Amendment

The oral argument transcript in Jones demonstrates real concern on the
bench that prior precedent was driving the Court into a corner in which it
would have to affirm a government position whose implications, although
resisted by the government, were clearly viewed by several Justices as
Orwellian. Thus, while normally the oral argument transcript is of
negligible importance in comparison to the written decision that follows,
here the give and take of the discussion, and its frequent departure from
the legal issue into broader social concerns, shows the deeper concerns
animating the final compromise that was the published opinion. Orwellian
rhetoric is rife in that discussion, and it marks a broad cultural
understanding of what protections the Fourth Amendment should
afford—even if, legally speaking, that is not what the Fourth Amendment
in fact currently protects. These expectations are found in an ordinary
citizen’s understanding of the Fourth Amendment, regardless of how
those expectations on the “street” diverge from what Fourth Amendment
precedent indicates is actually protected by the Constitution.320 The
dystopian rhetoric employed by several Justices reveals their beliefs that
a normative conceptualization of the relationship between citizen and
choose between automation or human discretion); Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L.
REV. 1735, 1759 (2015) (arguing that big data permits exclusion to be based on an abstraction, for
example digitally inferred or algorithmically anchored guilt or suspicion); Matthew Tokson,
Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 619 (2011) (contending that the real
harm is not the mere accessing of information, which is generally publicly available, but rather what
is then done with the already-disclosed information).
319. Jones, 556 U.S. at 419 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
320. See, e.g., supra notes 19–35 and accompanying text; infra Table 1 and accompanying text.
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government exists,321 one that, strictly speaking, carries no legal weight—
but one which nevertheless exerts a kind of gravitational pull on the
development of legal doctrine.322
Much of the Jones argument revolved around the Court’s 1982 case,
United States v. Knotts,323 which set forth the relevant legal standard and,
as applied to the facts, is not distinguishable in any material way from
Jones, according to the government. In an attempt to rebut the
government’s contention, Jones’s attorneys relied on a caveat in the
Knotts opinion, whereby the Court explained that should the precedent
one day open the door to over-intrusive government surveillance, the
Court would then be willing to revisit its holding or at least consider
whether different constitutional principles ought to shape the result.324
Knotts, following Katz, explained that the Fourth Amendment applies
where “the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a
‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been
invaded by government action.”325 The Court in Knotts elaborated on the
nature of the second prong of the Katz test as asking whether “the
individual’s expectation, viewed objectively, is ‘justifiable’ under the
circumstances.”326
Thus, and relevantly here, we can characterize the standard as
customary in nature insofar as the second prong involves asking whether
society would ratify an individual’s expectation of privacy “under the
circumstances” in which the individual held it. In other words, the second
step involves asking whether the individual’s privacy expectation
coincides with a broader social norm or whether it is just peculiar to that
individual. Moreover, what is reasonable is to some extent contextually
defined and, therefore, subject to change as the context changes.
Circumstantial reason leaves ample room for litigants to maneuver, but
also allows the Court to maintain a flexible Fourth Amendment doctrine.
In Jones, the government argued that the apparent intrusiveness of its
progressively comprehensive surveillance methods is mediated by a

321. See generally Kerr, The Mosaic Theory, supra note 47 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment
doctrine should evolve to help preserve the balance of power between citizen and government in the
face of emerging technologies).
322. The topic that is central to a robust debate in the international law context is the appropriate
role of custom in law, and how and when custom transforms into something that is cognizable as
embodying the force of law. See, e.g., Bradley & Gulati, supra note 20.
323. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
324. See id. at 283–84 (1983) (justifying the Court’s reservation of the issue for a later time).
325. Id. at 280 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)) (citations omitted).
326. Id. at 281 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)).
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public increasingly accustomed to being monitored by new forms of
technology.327 In short, the expectations of privacy are diminishing as
people come to understand that they are enmeshed in a weave of various
surveillance technologies and that they voluntarily assent to a number of
them. Jones’s attorneys argued that expectations of privacy have not
adapted to technological changes, thus exposing large swaths of society
to quotidian surveillance in ways that were not considered practicable
before.328 Put differently, increasingly comprehensive surveillance cannot
be socially normalized as “reasonable” because a society in which such
all-encompassing surveillance is the norm is prima facie unreasonable—
that is, it is something out of 1984.329
This legal quandary posed by Jones is what makes it distinguishable
from Knotts.330 In Knotts, law enforcement officers were able to discover
the location of a secluded methamphetamine drug laboratory by enclosing
a transmitting device in a can of chloroform sold to one of the
defendants.331 The car carrying the chloroform transmitted beeping
signals, enabling police to track the car even after pursuing agents
abandoned a physical tail.332 In Jones, the government argued that GPS is
simply a more technologically efficient and advanced beeper—the GPS
device is simply a super-beeper.333
In Knotts, the Court concluded there was no Fourth Amendment
violation.334 It began by claiming that the beeper provided no more than
locational information, explaining that “[t]he governmental surveillance
conducted by means of the beeper in this case amounted principally to the
following of an automobile on public streets and highways.”335 By this
logic, because a car driving down the road is subject to public scrutiny,
one cannot reasonably expect their location to be private; “[a] person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable

327. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 57.
328. Id. at 33–34, 44, 48.
329. See generally ORWELL, 1984, supra note 15; see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 466–67
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting from 1984 and concluding the opinion by arguing that
“[w]ho can read this passage without a shudder, and without the instinctive reaction that it depicts life
in some country other than ours?”).
330. See generally Hutchins, supra note 236 (outlining the legal implications of the Knotts
opinion).
331. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278–80 (1983).
332. Id. at 278.
333. See Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 4, 13, 60–61.
334. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
335. Id.
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expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”336
As the Court noted, by driving on the road, one is submitting to “[v]isual
surveillance.”337 However, one does not necessarily expect to constantly
transmit their location to the public through means of an electronic beeper.
Yet, the Court refused to find a qualitative difference between oldfashioned eyeballing and this form of electronic surveillance: “[n]othing
in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the
sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as
science and technology afforded them in this case.”338
Thus, according to the Court, technology that amplifies the capacity to
see what could be seen by the naked eye does not alter the Fourth
Amendment analysis.339 For example, using a searchlight to explore the
deck of a ship only reveals information that was already available to the
naked eye, albeit under limited conditions (i.e., during daylight hours to a
person situated in visual proximity to the deck).340 Similarly, the use of a
phone entails surrendering the number one has dialed to the third party
telecommunications provider because “[t]he switching equipment that
processed those numbers is merely the modern counterpart of the operator
who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls for the subscriber.”341
Thus, the human element might drop out of the surveillance equation
completely, rendered obsolete by technological improvements.
The automation of surveillance makes a quantitative increase in the
level of surveillance scrutiny to which a person can be subject feasible.
Thus, practically speaking, this diminishes one’s expectation of privacy
even if, from a legal perspective, there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy for things such as public location. Thus, in Knotts, there was no
basis to sanction the use of a beeper that continuously transmitted
locational information to the police as long as there was no expectation of
336. Id.
337. Id. at 282.
338. Id.
339. By contrast, technology that creates new capacities can invade Fourth Amendment
protections. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2001) (acknowledging that the rule
the court adopts must account for more sophisticated technologies that are already in use or being
developed). In Kyllo, however, the Court added a fascinating qualifier to when “sense-enhancing”
technology might not be a search: “where . . . the technology in question is not in general public use.”
Id. at 34. The Court did not define “general public use,” but the term raises the possibility that if
technology becomes sufficiently widespread and in use, it might be “exemp[t] from constitutional
scrutiny.” Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Technology
and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 48–49 (2002).
340. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282–83 (1983) (citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559, 563 (1927)).
341. Id. at 283 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1979)).
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privacy regarding such locational information in the first place. In other
words, “scientific enhancement . . . raises no constitutional issues which
visual surveillance would not also raise.”342
That should have put an end of the matter in Knotts; nevertheless, the
Court saw fit to entertain a “parade of horribles” argument that, based on
the reasoning of the case, should have been dismissed off-hand:
“[r]espondent does not actually quarrel with this analysis, though he
expresses the generalized view that the result of the holding sought by the
government would be that ‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen
of this country will be possible, without judicial knowledge or
supervision.’”343 In response to this contention, the Court observed that
merely alleging that the police are becoming more effective is insufficient
evidence of a constitutional violation, and that “the ‘reality hardly
suggests abuse.’”344 As a result, Knotts held there was no Fourth
Amendment violation where the beeper merely enhanced law
enforcement’s existing surveillance capabilities, while also noting that “if
such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions
should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”345
In other words, Knotts suggested that should the technological
capabilities of law enforcement change in such a manner that
enhancement of current surveillance abilities amounted to a qualitatively
different kind of surveillance, then at that future date, the Court might
scrutinize other constitutional principles to discover a limiting principle
regarding the conduct Knotts appears to sanction.346 Because the Knotts
court either did not take seriously the hypothetical proffered by plaintiff
regarding the flowering of a dragnet scheme of 24/7 surveillance, or
believed such capabilities to have been too distant and abstract to address
head-on in 1982, it decided to kick the proverbial can down the road. By
2010, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the futuristic “parade of horribles”
set forth in Knotts in fact reflected the current state of affairs.347 As such,
at oral argument, Justice Breyer reflected this sentiment in his statement
to the Government’s counsel in Jones: “if you win this case, then there is
342. Id. at 285.
343. Id. at 283 (citation omitted).
344. Id. at 283–84 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978)).
345. Id. at 284 (citation omitted).
346. Id.
347. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (reversing conviction
because it was obtained using evidence procured through warrantless GPS tracking in violation of the
Fourth Amendment).
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nothing to prevent the police or the government from monitoring 24 hours
a day the public movement of every citizen of the United States.”348
Jones marks a measured victory for those seeking more robust Fourth
Amendment protections in the face of technological advances, as the
Court’s resolution of the case was largely designed to reject the
government’s main contention that the Court’s established Fourth
Amendment precedent permits warrantless GPS surveillance for any
length of time. Nevertheless, Jones avoided the larger and unresolved
question of what should replace the prevailing two-prong Fourth
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy test to adequately address
the emerging dragnet-type cybersurveillance and dataveillance
technologies at the disposal of government and law enforcement actors.
Jones picked up where Knotts left off and, from the government’s
perspective during the Supreme Court oral argument, is indistinguishable
from it. The GPS device in Jones neither provided information about what
was inside Jones’s Jeep, nor conversations and activities carried out while
in the Jeep. It merely transmitted locational data on a constant basis.349
Knotts expressly stated that there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy with regard to the location of a vehicle driving along public roads
because such a vehicle was exposed to the general public.350 The GPS
device operated similarly to the beeper device in Knotts except that it
made long-term, comprehensive surveillance feasible, the results of which
were automatically recorded as data subject to law enforcement review at
their convenience.351 Knotts went out of its way to establish that
technological innovations that merely amplify existing surveillance
capacities do not raise any constitutional issues, provided that the
surveillance is restricted to movements subject to no reasonable
expectation of privacy.352 Justice Alito, in his Jones concurrence, declined
to “accept . . . the holding in United States v. Knotts” and criticized the
majority for deciding a case about a twenty-first century surveillance
technique “based on 18th-century tort law.”353
In Jones, the government attempted to articulate a number of
distinctions previously drawn by the Court to show it was acting in accord
348. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 13.
349. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429.
350. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
351. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Brief for Respondent, United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note
16, at 57.
352. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282–83.
353. Jones, 565 U.S. at 418–21 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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with settled precedent permitting warrantless surveillance, including:
public versus private spaces in Knotts; interference with possessory
interests versus technical trespasses in United States v. Karo;354 and open
fields doctrine versus trespass law violations in Oliver v. United States.355
The government explained, “there are enclaves of Fourth Amendment
protection that this Court has recognized” and the usage of the GPS
technology at issue in Jones does not fall within these specified
enclaves.356 The government also reminded the Court that it previously
dealt with surveillance technology that at the time of the Court’s
contemplation “seemed extraordinarily advanced.”357
During oral argument in Jones, the Deputy Solicitor General, Michael
Dreeben, explained to the Court, “if this Court agrees with principles in
Knotts and Karo and applies them to this case, the [privacy] remedy is
through legislation.”358 Congress indeed has taken action to protect
privacy interests legislatively in light of advancing electronic
communication technologies.359 The “privacy mosaic theory” advanced
by the D.C. Circuit to preserve the Fourth Amendment’s protections in
Jones was met with the government’s counter-theory, an investigation
mosaic theory.360 The government argued that the point of any
investigation is to piece together a mosaic and that the Court has allowed
the government in the past to utilize tools to build that mosaic.361 GPS is
not the only tool that helps in the development of the mosaic, the
government explained, “[s]o does a pen register. So does a garbage pull.
So does looking at everybody’s credit card statement for a month. All of
those things this Court has held are not searches.”362 During the Jones oral
argument, the government concluded, “[i]f this Court believes that there
is an excessive chill created by an actual law or universal practice of
monitoring people through GPS, there are other constitutional principles
[such as the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment] that are

354. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
355. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
356. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 12.
357. Id. at 13.
358. Id. at 11–12.
359. See generally Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522
(2006).
360. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 16; DAVID COLE,
ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM
(2003) (noting that government has argued regularly that it builds a mosaic around terrorist suspects).
361. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 16.
362. Id. at 16.
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available.”363 The government also concluded, “if the Court believes that
there needs to be a Fourth Amendment safeguard as well [as a legislative
one], we have urged as a fallback position that the Court adopt a
reasonable suspicion standard.”364
Justice Alito’s concurrence, in which Justice Kagan joined, recognized
the potentiality of the “reasonable expectation” test to actually
accommodate ever-increasing government intrusiveness.365 Justice Alito
noted that the “hypothetical reasonable person” is presumed to have a
“well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But technology
can change those expectations.”366 People accept diminished privacy as a
“tradeoff” for the “increased convenience or security” of new technology
and “even if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that
new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this
development as inevitable.”367 In other words, the test is grounded in
changing social norms that the Court must then give effect to as a form of
customary law—the custom here being the general expectation about
what can reasonably be kept private.
B.

Preserving Reasonable Expectations in an Unreasonable
Cybersurveillance State

Unlike the D.C. Circuit, which had relied upon a digital mosaic theory,
the Jones Court did not seem to have any clear direction on how to
distinguish Knotts.368 The oral argument did not seem to address the fact
that Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy when traveling on
public thoroughfares. Instead, as noted above, it was the aspects of the
case that Knotts held immaterial that seemed most objectionable in
Jones—that the surveillance was automatic and effortless, and that it was
all-encompassing. The context in which an average individual had no
reasonable expectation of privacy had changed between Knotts and Jones:
The National Surveillance State had acquired surveillance technology
that, unrestrained, appeared itself unreasonable.
Justice Alito’s concurrence does not fully explain how he would have
resolved the case; however, he offers a critical shift away from privacy
363. Id. at 23.
364. Id. at 26.
365. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 426–27 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See, e.g., Kerr, Mosaic Theory, supra note 5, at 323–24 (discussing that Jones argued on
appeal that Knotts was distinguishable because a GPS was “‘light years away’ from a radio beeper”).
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and toward intrusion: “[t]he best that we can do in this case is apply
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS
tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a
reasonable person would not have anticipated.”369 It is not clear that
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine is actually being applied in this
formulation, since “intrusiveness” does not necessarily equate to a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
Further, what constitutes over-intrusive surveillance remains
unelaborated. Indeed, Justice Alito’s concurrence avoids these questions
by invoking a certitude that the Fourth Amendment bars the government’s
conduct: “[w]e need not identify with precision the point at which the
tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed
before the 4-week mark.”370 That perspective, which enables the analysis
to proceed without elaboration, is precisely the hallmark of the Orwellian
tipping point: it confirms the inference that something improper was
before the Court while betraying uncertainty as to exactly why, legally
speaking, the Constitution is offended. In the context of Justice Alito’s
concurrence, it enables an ipse dixit assertion that the Fourth Amendment
is offended, while leaving it to later cases to parse out just when the
government’s surveillance transforms into an unreasonable search due to
its prolonged nature.
The Jones argument had several moments where several of the Justices
recognized that they were faced with an unreasonable state of affairs
without the ability to articulate a legal doctrine that is violated by its
presence. Here is Justice Breyer, early in the argument, speaking to the
government’s counsel:
[I]f you win this case, then there is nothing to prevent the police
or the government from monitoring 24 hours a day the public
movement of every citizen of the United States. And—and the
difference between the monitoring and what happened in the past
is memories are fallible; computers aren’t.
And no one, or at least very rarely, sends human being to follow
people 24 hours a day. That occasionally happens. But with the
machines, you can. So, if you win, you suddenly produce what
sounds like 1984 from their brief. I understand they have an
interest in perhaps dramatizing that, but—but maybe overly. But
it still sounds like it.371

369. Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
370. Id.
371. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 13.
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Justice Scalia pointed out that this tack was flawed in that, while it
painted an unpleasant scenario, it failed to offer a legally cognizable
constitutional problem. With characteristic cutting wit, he interjected at a
later point in the argument, “[w]ell, it must be unconstitutional if it’s
scary . . . . I mean, what is it, the scary provision of what article?”372 Yet,
for all that, the Justices were uninhibited. Thus, Justice Breyer was
unabashed in explaining the stakes: “what would a democratic society
look like if a large number of people did think that the government was
tracking their every movement over long periods of time?”373
Justice Ginsburg articulated, without being able to resolve, the problem
of how reasonable expectations of privacy as set forth in current Court
doctrine can lead to altogether unreasonable results in the context of
current surveillance capabilities:
But the Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable
searches and seizures. And if I were to try to explain to someone,
here’s the Fourth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment says—or
it has been interpreted to mean that if I’m on a public bus and the
police want to feel my luggage, that’s a violation; and yet, this
kind of monitoring, installing the GPS and monitoring the
person’s movement whenever they are outside their house in the
car, is not? I mean, it just—there’s something about it that—that
just doesn’t parse.374
Several of the Justices, in other words, recognized the 1984 problem in
light of Katz and Knotts, and suggested a modification of doctrine was
necessary. The manner in which the Justices discussed this modification
suggested that the Katz privacy test should lead with the societal inquiry
first. Table 1 below shows why leading with the societal cybersurveillance
intrusion inquiry before the individual subjective privacy interest would
appear to have made more sense to some of the Justices during oral
argument.
During the oral argument in Jones, several of the Justices suggested
that the Katz privacy test appears to reach its limit where its reasonable
expectations test risks the Court’s ratification of an unreasonable state of
government overreach.375 At that juncture, Table 1 attempts to illustrate
how an evolution of the Katz test occurs where, starting from the societal
perspective, a federal court must assess the level of cybersurveillance

372.
373.
374.
375.

Id. at 37.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 23–24.
See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16.

1890

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1819

intrusion it is asked to ratify and interrogate whether it is unreasonable.
At that point, the court must unmoor itself from preexisting Fourth
Amendment doctrine and, on the facts, hold against the government’s
cybersurveillance practice.376
Table 1 attempts to set forth the four iterations that are possible under
the Katz privacy test. Box A shows what is required to satisfy the Katz
privacy test: subjective and objective expectations of privacy must be met.
Boxes B, C, and D all demonstrate when the Katz privacy test is not
satisfied. Box B illustrates that an individual may not enjoy a subjective
expectation of privacy; nonetheless, society may assert a societal-wide
expectation of privacy. Oppositely, Box C indicates that a person may
hold an expectation of privacy, while society may not grant such a right.
Finally, Box D demonstrates when neither individuals, subjectively, nor
society at large, objectively, can assert a reasonable expectation of privacy
under the Fourth Amendment.
Specifically, Table 1 focuses on the distinctions between Box B and
Box D. Box B represents the viewpoint of several Justices during oral
argument in Jones. The cybersurveillance intrusion presented in the facts
in Jones appeared to lead to a split: some Justices appeared to agree that
a subjective expectation of privacy does not exist to protect an individual
from being tracked on public thoroughfares; however, an objective
expectation of privacy prohibits warrantless GPS tracking. Box D
represents the viewpoint of the government during oral argument in Jones.
The government argued that there was neither a subjective nor objective
expectation of privacy because, eventually, warrantless GPS tracking
would become normalized.

376. See generally Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 466–67 (1989).
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Table 1:
The Four Iterations of the Katz Test
Subjective Expectation of
Privacy Exists

Subjective Expectation of
Privacy Does Not Exist

Objective Expectation of Privacy Exists
Box A

Box B

In Katz v. United States,377
Fourth Amendment Violation:

In United States v. Jones,378
several Justices at Oral
Argument:

(1) Subjective Inquiry: Would a
reasonable person expect that
the information (e.g., data,
electronic communication)
should be kept from others?
Yes.
(2) Objective Inquiry:
Would society ratify that the
information should be kept
private? Yes.

(1) Subjective Inquiry: Would a
reasonable person expect that
geolocational data collected on
public thoroughfares should be
kept from others? No: See
United States v. Knotts.379
(2) Objective Inquiry:
Would society ratify that the
information should be kept
private? Yes: the Fourth
Amendment should protect
against warrantless 24/7 GPS
tracking based upon a
commonly held understanding
of protection against
unreasonable intrusion.

Objective Expectation of Privacy Does Not Exist
Box C

Box D

United States v. Jacobsen380
No Fourth Amendment
Violation:

Government at Oral Argument
in United States v. Jones:381

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
565 U.S. 400 (2012).
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
466 U.S. 109 (1984).
565 U.S. 400 (2012).
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(1) Subjective Inquiry: Would a
reasonable person expect that
the contents of luggage should
be kept from others? Yes.
(2) Objective Inquiry:
If a drug-sniffing dog does not
search contents and only detects
presence of drugs? No: No
societal expectation of privacy.

[Vol. 92:1819

(1) Subjective Inquiry: Would a
reasonable person expect that
geolocational data collected on
public thoroughfares should be
kept from others? No: United
States v. Knotts.382
(2) Objective Inquiry:
As tracking technologies
become more integrated, GPS
will become reasonable.383
Government: No societal
expectation of privacy.384
Justices: Sounds like 1984.385

Table 1 illustrates the government’s assertion during the oral argument
in Jones that, under Katz and Knotts, the Justices should find that the facts
of Jones fall into Box D: No Subjective Individual Expectation of Privacy
and No Objective Societal Expectation of Privacy. The government
contended that Mr. Jones should not be able to argue that he has a
subjective expectation of privacy because information gathered on
movements traveled over public thoroughfares is not private under
Knotts.386 The government also implied that as GPS tracking becomes
more normalized, warrantless 24/7 GPS tracking does not offend
society.387 The Justices seemed to respond by saying, “that sounds
Orwellian.”388 Yet, the Justices seemed to concede that the facts in Jones
would preclude it from Box A. Because of Knotts, the facts of Jones fall
into Box B. However, Box B would not lead to a Fourth Amendment
violation under the Katz privacy test. Therefore, Table 1 explains why the

382. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
383. See Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 57.
384. See id.
385. Id. at 13.
386. See Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 15, United States v. Jones, 615 F.3d 544
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3034) (arguing that electronic tracking is merely a substitute for visual
surveillance).
387. Id.
388. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 13 (Justice
Breyer: “[s]o, if you win, you suddenly produce what sounds like 1984 from their brief. . . . And so,
what protection is there, if any, once we accept your view of the case, from this slight futuristic
scenario that’s just been painted and is done more so in their briefs?”).
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Katz test failed in Jones. Table 1 further illustrates why the Court appeared
to seek a way to resolve Jones without resort to the Katz test.
In other words, the Court was faced with a conundrum: if the Court’s
reasonable expectation of privacy jurisprudence is explained to a
reasonable person, in this context, warrantless 24/7 surveillance does not
appear reasonable. Justice Roberts takes up this point at another juncture
in the Jones oral argument:
You can see, though, can’t you, that 30 years ago if you asked
people does it violate your privacy to be followed by a beeper, the
police following you, you might get one answer, while today if
you ask people does it violate your right to privacy to know that
the police can have a record of every movement you made in the
past month, they might see that differently?389
Justice Roberts articulated distinctions that do not make a difference
under Knotts. He is intuitively asserting, however, that the average person
on the street would assent to the notion that such a scenario would
constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. While the D.C. Circuit’s
holding rested within the Knotts framework, the argument before the
Court seemed to proceed in a different direction. The Justices seemed to
be wrestling with the notion of whether Knotts was itself reasonable in the
modern age of cybersurveillance.390 The argument cuts both ways. One
avenue, advanced briefly by the government at oral argument, contended
that what is reasonable is subject to change and that as technology such as
GPS becomes normalized, expectations of privacy will alter to
accommodate them. Put differently, the reasonable expectation of privacy
exists in an increasingly diminished sphere as the public itself grows to
embrace technologies that effectually turn the private into public. Thus
Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben advances this line of defense
at oral argument:
Mr. Chief Justice, advancing technology cuts in two directions.
Technological advances can make the police more efficient at
what they do through some of the examples that were discussed
today: Cameras, airplanes, beepers, GPS. At the same time,
technology and how it’s used can change our expectations of
privacy in the ways that Justice Alito was alluding to. Today
perhaps GPS can be portrayed as a 1984-type invasion, but as
people use GPS in their lives and for other purposes, our

389. Id. at 22.
390. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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expectations of privacy surrounding our location may also
change. For that —391
At that point, however, the Deputy Solicitor General was cut off
because the thrust of the argument was clear and unacceptable:
JUSTICE KAGAN: Dreeben, that—that seems too much to me. I
mean, if you think about this, and you think about a little robotic
device following you around 24 hours a day anyplace you go
that’s not your home, reporting in all your movements to the
police, to investigative authorities, the notion that we don’t have
an expectation of privacy in that, the notion that we don’t think
that our privacy interests would be violated by this robotic device,
I’m—I’m not sure how one can say that.392
Yet, it is worth noting that Justice Kagan’s concerns, once again, do
not register a problem under Knotts. If the “robotic device” following you
around is observing nothing other than what could be observed by a
bystander on a public road, then the fact of automation is itself a
distinction without a difference under Knotts. But Justice Kagan did not
attempt to articulate a legal principle here; rather, she rehearsed a set of
circumstances that appear intuitively unacceptable—dystopian, antidemocratic, and Orwellian.
Table 2 (below) offers up a new type of test that the Court implied
might be needed in light of both (A) shifting government practices in
virtual searches and seizures, and search and seizures of identity; and (B)
the type of conditioned acquiescence to surveillance that the government
suggested was nearly inevitable. The Court’s confusion on how to
reconcile privacy interests of surveillance in public and private spaces was
palpable during oral argument in Jones. During oral argument, the Court
sought, but did not receive, guidance from the government on whether an
alternative to the Katz test could be fashioned if warrantless GPS tracking
were allowed under the Fourth Amendment.
The oral argument seemed to reveal that the Court was not ready to do
more than signal a cybersurveillance nonintrusion test was possible.393
The Jones decision does not adopt a cybersurveillance nonintrusion test.
Instead, Justice Scalia’s opinion returned to the physical trespass as an
alternative to a Katz test for physical intrusions.394 The Court did not
outwardly weigh the advantages or disadvantages of an alternative to the

391.
392.
393.
394.

Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 57.
Id. at 57–58.
Id.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012).

2017

CYBERSURVEILLANCE NONINTRUSION TEST

1895

Katz privacy test for non-physical intrusions.395 Jones also failed to reach
the issue central to the privacy question because it was able to find a
narrower violation of the Fourth Amendment on the basis of a physical
trespass.396 Despite the majority’s failure to acknowledge the need for a
new test in the text of the opinion, the oral argument seemed to reveal that
the current structure of the Katz privacy test would yield the wrong
constitutional outcome. Invocation to 1984 and the Justices’ lines of
reasoning implied that the society’s objective expectation of privacy
should trump the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy in the
particular facts before the Court in Jones.
Table 2 describes how certain Justices of the Court implied a
cybersurveillance nonintrusion test may be more appropriate than the Katz
test during oral argument in Jones.
Table 2:
Katz Privacy Test v. Cybersurveillance Nonintrusion Test Implied
by Jones’s Oral Argument
Privacy Test
Box A
In Katz v. United States,397
Fourth Amendment Violation:
(1) Subjective Inquiry: Would
a reasonable person expect that
the information (e.g., data,
electronic communication)
should be kept from others?
Yes.
(2) Objective Inquiry:
Would society ratify that the
information should be kept
private? Yes.

Cybersurveillance Nonintrusion Test
Box B
In United States v. Jones,398
Potential New Test Implied by
Concurrences and at Oral Argument:
(1) Objective Inquiry: Would society
expect that the government intrusion
was unreasonable (or construed
government action to be a search and
seizure) under commonly held
understandings of the Fourth
Amendment (based upon culturally
ingrained expectations or privacy
customs of society)? Yes.
(2) Subjective Inquiry:
Would a reasonable person have
considered the government intrusion to
be a search and seizure, and
unexpected and unjustified? Yes.

395.
396.
397.
398.

Id.
Id.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
565 U.S. 400 (2012).
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In other words, the Court implied that the Katz subjective-objective test
could effectively be flipped to become an objective-subjective test. Rather
than leading with the inquiry of whether an individual may subjectively
enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy and then proceeding to an
objective analysis of whether society would ratify that viewpoint, the
Court seemed to imply at oral argument that the more important inquiry
was to consider society’s viewpoint at large first. As such, it is this
author’s belief that a more promising approach would be to begin with a
baseline societal standard—a commonly understood version of Fourth
Amendment protections—from a societal point of view, which could be
drawn from customary law traditions. Customary international law, for
example, provides a basis for understanding human rights traditions and
can be translated into human rights laws, conventions, and treaties.399
C.

A Cybersurveillance Nonintrusion Test Under the Fourth
Amendment

To address the growing challenges of cybersurveillance technologies,
and the harms emanating from the protocols and programs of
bureaucratized cybersurveillance, a new cybersurveillance nonintrusion
test rather than a privacy test could be implemented. A cybersurveillance
nonintrusion test would start with a consideration of privacy customs and
the norms and values of democratic society. The secondary inquiry would
be whether a subjective expectation of protection from government
intrusion is reasonable. The subjective inquiry would not focus on an
individualized privacy expectation, but rather on the question of whether
or not an intrusion has occurred. Unlike the Katz test, the burden on the
cybersurveillance nonintrusion test would be on the government to justify
whether the surveillance technique is reasonable in light of the values of
a democratic society.400 Requiring the government to justify its
surveillance is consistent with the arguments raised by Justice Harlan in
White and Justice Brennan in Riley.401

399. See, e.g., Bradley & Gulati, supra note 20, at 209:
Treaties also address numerous issues that were not historically regulated (at least extensively)
by international law, including environmental conservation, the protection of human rights, and
the prosecution of international crimes. Customary International Law nevertheless continues to
play an important role in international law and adjudication, regulating both within the gaps of
treaties as well as the conduct of nonparties to the treaties.
Id.
400. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 793 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
401. See supra notes 279–298 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, a cybersurveillance nonintrusion test would offer a more
flexible and suitable method to evaluate whether a government action
involving cybersurveillance violated the spirit of the Fourth Amendment,
in addition to the letter. Such a test would shift the calculation away from
what level of privacy is reasonable or whether certain types of information
should be kept from others under the perspective of a hypothetical
reasonable person. This move is critical given the nature of modern bigdata technologies, which necessitate the sharing of private information
with a wide range of third parties.402 Once the calculation is shifted away
from the axis of privacy, the courts would be empowered to develop a new
conceptualization of the Fourth Amendment that rotates around intrusion
as a legal concept. As we move toward ever-diminishing degrees of
personal privacy as a result of a confluence of technologically and geopolitical factors, a new axis of cybersurveillance nonintrusion as the
lynchpin for protecting Fourth Amendment rights should prove fruitful in
securing society’s and citizens’ constitutionally protected privacy
interests.
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence from Jones hinted at this need to shift
from privacy to cybersurveillance nonintrusion, and to lead with an
inquiry that first addresses broad-based societal concerns and interests,
rather than individual rights concerns, in contemplating the potential
Fourth Amendment harms at play within the realm of cybersurveillance:
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms. And the Government’s
unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of
identity . . . may “alter the relationship between citizen and
government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.”403
This cybersurveillance nonintrusion test suggested by the concurring
opinions in Jones appears preferable to the mosaic theory as we enter
more completely into the realm of big data cybersurveillance.
Despite this precedent, the concurring justices in Jones, however, did
not expressly adopt the mosaic theory reasoning of the D.C. Circuit. In
fact, the broad brushstrokes of their concurrences instead suggest that a
preference for a new direction is potentially forthcoming. Justice Alito
and the three additional Justices who joined him (Justice Breyer, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Kagan), as well as Justice Sotomayor in a separate
concurrence, all appeared to signal their beliefs that a shift in doctrine
might be needed in light of increasingly comprehensive and invasive
cybersurveillance technologies. This seems to indicate that a majority of
402. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
403. Id. at 416 (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011)).
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the justices are clearly open to a new Fourth Amendment approach in the
face of rapidly evolving surveillance technologies.
Table 3 explains the differences between a cybersurveillance
nonintrusion test and the Katz privacy test, and why a cybersurveillance
nonintrusion test that is grounded in customary law is now more
appropriate in light of the new and unprecedented challenges posed by big
data cybersurveillance, including the metaphysical harms of
cybersurveillance and the threat of “precrime.”
Table 3: The Distinctions Between the Katz Test and a
Cybersurveillance Nonintrusion Test404
Cybersurveillance Nonintrusion Test

Katz Privacy Test

When the tests are used
Under Fourth Amendment (Pertaining to
Emerging Mass Surveillance and
Cybersurveillance Methods)405

Under Fourth
Amendment406

Government Action in Question:
Unreasonable Search and Seizure of
Digitally Constructed Identity and
Personally Identifiable Digital Data?407

Government Action in
Question: Unreasonable
Search and Seizure of
Person and Property? 408

404. This chart originally appeared in the American Criminal Law Review. See Hu,
Cybersurveillance Intrusions and an Evolving Katz Privacy Test, supra note 36.
405. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
406. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
407. Jones, 565 U.S. at 402.
408. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Paradigmatic Case: Mass analytics and
predictive analytics to anticipate guilt or
predict future wrongdoing; “Precrime:”
Government searching and seizing
personally identifiable data of mass
populations or subpopulations and
locating suspects based on data searches;
and determine one’s probabilistic
likelihood or statistical predisposition to
commit crime or terrorism409

Paradigmatic Case:
Government searching and
seizing contents of one’s
diary or letters410

Unlikely to be used by police (unless, for
example, a traffic stop was generated by
an algorithm)

Commonly used by police

Expectations under the tests
Expectation of Cybersurveillance
Nonintrusion under Fourth Amendment:
Reasonable Expectation to be Free of
Unreasonable Cybersurveillance and
Government Intrusion411

Expectation of Privacy
under Fourth Amendment:
Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy and Expectation to
be Free of Unreasonable
Government Searches and
Seizures of Physical Person
and Physical Possessions412

No Third Party Doctrine: Expectation of
cybersurveillance nonintrusion does not
pivot on whether information was shared
with others413

Third Party Doctrine: No
expectation of privacy if
information shared with
third party414

409. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (presenting prima facie challenges to
a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act of 2008, which empowers the
FISA Court to authorize surveillance without a showing of probable cause that the target of
surveillance is an agent of a foreign power).
410. Katz, 389 U.S. at 365.
411. Jones, 565 U.S. at 410–12.
412. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
413. Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (questioning the applicability of the Third
Party doctrine to modern technology and Fourth Amendment analysis).
414. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (articulating the Third Party Doctrine).
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Grounded in the positive right
perspective (or hybrid) of the Fourth
Amendment: “The Right of the People to
be Secure in their Persons, Papers, and
Effects”415
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Grounded in the negative
right perspective of the
Fourth Amendment: Free
from Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures416

Focus of judicial inquiry under the tests
Objective inquiry is leading question:
Objectively, does society have a
reasonable expectation to be protected
from government intrusion (e.g., big data
cybersurveillance) in this particular
instance?417

Subjective inquiry is
currently the leading
question in Katz privacy
test: Subjectively, does the
individual have a
reasonable expectation of
privacy (e.g., expected
personal information would
be kept private) in this
particular instance?418

Vantage Point of Inquiry: Societal
Interest in Open Democratic Society
(e.g., to be free from “1984”-type
surveillance)419

Vantage Point of Inquiry:
Personal Interest in
Maintaining Information
Private420

415. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392
(1971) (“It guarantees to citizens of the United States the absolute right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures . . . .”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Making the Right Case for a Constitutional Right
to Minimum Entitlements, 44 MERCER L. REV. 525, 534 (1993) (noting that the Constitution creates
affirmative duties); Gray, Dangerous Dicta, supra note 5, at 1181 (quoting the Fourth Amendment
protections); Gray, A Collective Right, supra note 41 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment
unambiguously refers to collective rights).
416. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 646 (2008)
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment describes a right against governmental interference rather than an
affirmative right to engage in protected conduct . . . .”); Katz, 389 U.S. 347; Tracey Maclin, Justice
Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 772 (1992)
(“Thus, Fourth Amendment rights are seldom considered positive rights. Rather, the Court generally
views them as restraints on law enforcement to be acknowledged, but not taken seriously.”).
417. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
418. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
419. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 13, 25, 27, 33, 35, 57
(referring to George Orwell’s 1984).
420. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Government Must First Demonstrate
Mass Surveillance or Cybersurveillance
Method is Necessary and Efficacious
(e.g., Fourth Amendment Special Needs
Doctrine or Special Needs Exception to
Fourth Amendment Applies)421

1901

Individual Must First
Demonstrate IndividualBased Subjective Privacy
Interest is Protected Under
Fourth Amendment422 and
provide evidence of
unreliability423

Need for the tests
Big Data Cybersurveillance: Era of
digital-based and database-driven
information

Small Data Surveillance:
Era of analog-based
information

Intangible Harms: Realm of virtual
reality, virtual cybersurveillance, and
artificial intelligence and/or algorithmic
intelligence

Tangible Harms: Physical
or property-based harms,
realm of traditional notion
of reality and human
intelligence and sensorybased surveillance

Protection from Big Data Inferences of
Guilt or Suspicion from Correlative
Data-Driven Evidence and Statistical
Algorithms (e.g., Protection from
“Guilty Until Proven Innocent” Status)424

Protection from Unwanted
Revelatory Information;
Physical Trespass; and
Reputational or Privacy
Tort Harms425

421. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 792–
93 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he burden of guarding privacy in a free society should not be
on its citizens; it is the Government that must justify its need to electronically eavesdrop.”).
422. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
423. See, e.g., United States v. Esquivel-Rios, 725 F.3d 1231, 1239 (10th Cir. 2013) (contending
that the interaction between the reasonable suspicion standard and the use of law enforcement
databases that are imperfect and prevalent should get the full vetting it deserves so the court can
confidently render a decision); United States v. Cortez-Galaviz, 495 F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007)
(questioning the validity of database information).
424. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (presenting prima facie challenges to
a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act of 2008 that permitted FISC to
authorize surveillance of a target without a showing of probable cause).
425. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53.
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Where the tests originated
Concurrences and oral argument in
Jones: Suggestion that societal-based
rights may now center the normative
commitment of the Fourth
Amendment426

Before Jones:
Conceptualization that
individual-based rights
center the normative
commitment of the Fourth
Amendment427

Constitutional implications of mass
cybersurveillance and warrantless,
suspicionless tracking play out on public,
society-wide level428

Constitutional implications
of warrantless tracking or
suspicionless surveillance
of individual suspect
unfold on personal,
individual-rights level429

Grounded in Customary Law430

Grounded in Property Law
and Tort Law431

Future direction of the tests
Cybersurveillance nonintrusion appears
to be transforming into the potential new
axis for doctrinal analysis under Fourth
Amendment inquiry after Jones432

Privacy is current axis for
doctrinal analysis under
Fourth Amendment inquiry
after Katz433

CONCLUSION
The Court has signaled an understanding that the Fourth Amendment
doctrine must now evolve to accommodate limitations on government
intrusiveness in light of increasingly comprehensive and invasive
426. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, supra note 16, at 13, 25, 27, 33, 35, 57
(discussing George Orwell’s 1984 in relation to broad surveillance).
427. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
428. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 209; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 209; see also supra notes
216–29 and accompanying text; supra Part II.
429. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
430. See, e.g., supra notes 14, 19–27, 322.
431. See, e.g., supra notes 36–37, 244–45 and accompanying text.
432. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 418–20 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
433. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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cybersurveillance technologies. The Court has implied that this evolution
is appropriate and necessary to impose meaningful limitations on the
depth and scope of the potential government intrusion. With the
emergence of big data cybersurveillance and the search and seizure of
digitally constructed identity, a different Fourth Amendment framework
is required. The Katz privacy test must be abandoned because the
underlying fundamental principles of the Fourth Amendment are at risk
of being undermined by it. In the coming years, the government will likely
continue to expand big data cybersurveillance programs under the
justification of immigration and crime control objectives, as well as
counterterrorism policies. Thus, the need for a revision of the doctrine is
urgent. This new type of constitutional harm is facilitated by an axial age
of technology that has put the tools of big data, data surveillance or
dataveillance, and cybersurveillance at the disposal of the government.
The Jones Court held that GPS tracking devices are subject to the tort
doctrine of trespass and may not be surreptitiously placed on a person’s
effects without his or her consent, at least without a warrant. Thus, the
Court’s holding in Jones has only temporarily avoided the thornier
question of whether the Court’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”
doctrine under Katz will impose any meaningful restraints on the
government’s growing virtual cybersurveillance and dataveillance
capacities. In short, Jones made clear that Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has not yet developed a limiting principle to curtail the
effects of rapidly advancing technology in the realm of cybersurveillance
and dataveillance. During oral argument and in the concurrences filed by
Justice Alito and Justice Sotomayor, the Court signaled the potential to
shift the inquiry away from emphasizing a privacy interest to recognizing
a right against unreasonable government intrusion. The anti-surveillance
norms of democratic society were on full display through references to
1984 during the oral argument of Jones. In essence, a close observation
of the line of reasoning at oral argument and in the concurring opinions in
Jones reveals that the societal interest should be predominant as a first line
of inquiry.
The Court’s invocation to 1984 during oral argument in Jones reflects
that these limitations are culturally ingrained and, therefore, must be part
of an assessment of whether the surveillance is considered objectively or
subjectively reasonable. The Court has suggested that an inquiry that
pivots around a concept of cybersurveillance nonintrusion rather than
privacy might be more appropriate in the digital age. The
cybersurveillance nonintrusion test implicitly suggested by the Court first
shifts the vantage point of the Fourth Amendment analysis from an
individual-based tangible harm inquiry to an inquiry of a society-wide
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intangible harm. Next, the cybersurveillance nonintrusion test shifts the
burden from an individual citizen to the government. Under the current
privacy test, an individual must first establish a subjective reasonable
expectation of privacy. The cybersurveillance nonintrusion test instead
requires the government to justify the intrusion of the surveillance on
society. The Supreme Court and post-Snowden federal courts appear to
be using the Orwellian trope both to establish the society-wide intangible
harm: 1984-type scenarios that violate established privacy customs in a
democratic society; and to engage the cybersurveillance nonintrusion test
to ask the government to overcome the 1984 problem presented by
contemporary surveillance methods.
The oral argument during Jones signaled an emerging
cybersurveillance nonintrusion test under the Fourth Amendment. This
Article concludes that such a test could be grounded in customary law,
and could replace the Fourth Amendment privacy test currently grounded
in property and tort law. To preserve the integrity of the Fourth
Amendment and the normative values it was intended to protect, a
dramatic revision of the Fourth Amendment doctrine, including the
adoption of a cybersurveillance nonintrusion test and the abandonment of
the current Fourth Amendment privacy test, is now required.

